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I. INTRODUCTION 
“They’ve got all these perverse fantasies about what might happen with the 
citizens commission,” said Daniel Tokaji.1 “None of them are nearly as bad as what 
actually happened in real life.”2 A preeminent authority on election law, Tokaji was 
co-author of Ohio Ballot Issue 2, a referendum curbing the state legislature’s ability 
to gerrymander electoral maps.3 Issue 2 asked Ohio voters to consider a 
constitutional amendment which would appoint a citizens commission to redraw 
congressional districts.4 By the summer of 2012, Voters First Ohio, a coalition of 
academics, unions, and civic groups collectively sponsoring the referendum, found 
itself on the defensive. 
Issue 2 was under attack. Conservative special interests burnt millions of dollars 
in opposition, characterizing Issue 2 as “[a] large new government bureaucracy [that] 
can demand unlimited tax dollars.”5 Both the Ohio Bar Association6 and the Ohio 
Court of Appeals Judges Association also publicly opposed the issue.7 In the months 
leading up to the election, Voters First found themselves embroiled in a protracted 
ballot-language dispute which was ultimately certified to the Ohio Supreme Court.8 
                                                                                                                                         
 1 Joe Guillen, Ohio Redistricting Plan Mirrors California Proposal That Failed to 
Remove Politics From the Process, PLAIN DEALER (Aug. 26, 2012), 
http://www.cleveland.com/open/index.ssf/2012/08/ohio_redistricting_plan_mirror.html. 
 2 Id. 
 3 A year prior to Issue 2’s certification, Professor Tokaji was asked to testify in front of 
the State Government and Elections Subcommittee on Redistricting. There he stressed that the 
most important factor in designing a redistricting plan “is the necessity of a fair, transparent, 
and open process that affords the public ample opportunity to review and comment on 
potential plans before they are enacted.” Testimony Before the Ohio H.R. State Gov’t and 
Elections Subcomm. on Redistricting (July 20, 2011) (statement of Daniel P. Tokaji), 
available at http://www.sos.state.oh.us/sos/upload/reshape/testimony/2011-07-20-tokaji.pdf. 
 4 Kate Irby, Ohio Issue 2 Supporters Say Long Ballot Summary Is Confusing Voters, 
PLAIN DEALER (Nov. 1, 2012), 
http://www.cleveland.com/open/index.ssf/2012/11/ohio_issue_2_supporters_say_lo.html. 
 5 OHIO BALLOT BD., ARGUMENT AGAINST ISSUE 2 (2012), available at 
http://www.sos.state.oh.us/sos/upload/ballotboard/2012/2-against.pdf [hereinafter ARGUMENTS 
AGAINST]. 
 6 Statement on Ohio Redistricting Amendment, OHIO STATE BAR ASS’N (2012), available 
at https://www.ohiobar.org/NewsAndPublications/News/OSBANews/Pages/OSBA-releases-
statement-on-Ohio-Redistricting-Amendment.aspx (last visited Jan. 31 2014). 
 7 Joe Guillen, Appellate Court Judges Say 'No Thanks' to Inclusion in Redistricting 
Reform Proposal, PLAIN DEALER (Aug. 16, 2012), 
http://www.cleveland.com/open/index.ssf/2012/08/appellate_court_judges_say_no.html. 
 8 Jim Siegel, High Court Tells Ballot Board to Rewrite Issue 2, COLUMBUS DISPATCH 
(Sept. 13, 2012), http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2012/09/13/high-court-tells-
ballot-board-to-rewrite-issue-2.html. 
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol63/iss4/10
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In the November 6th General Election, Issue 2 lost badly. Stripped of context, this 
might seem surprising.9 Gerrymandering reform is a surprisingly bipartisan issue.10 
In Ohio, Issue 2 opponents publicly criticized the state’s redistricting process.11 
Examined in isolation, Issue 2 was neither innovative nor terribly controversial. The 
architecture was largely borrowed from California’s redistricting process, a 
referendum which enjoyed wide voter approval.12 Still, nearly every county in Ohio, 
from crimson red to navy blue, squarely rejected the proposal.13  
This Note proposes to explain the construction and political history of the 2012 
Ohio Ballot Issue 2, extract lessons learned from its defeat, and, using those lessons, 
construct an alternative model referendum for congressional redistricting reform.  
What events led up to the November General Election defeat? Part II explores the 
history of redistricting and referendum. I also include a discussion on the various 
models of citizens redistricting commissions, including those adopted in California 
and Arizona (from which Ohio Issue 2 was largely borrowed), as well as recent 
constitutional challenges to citizens redistricting commissions. 
In Part III, I discuss the lessons learned in how Issue 2 incorporated state judges 
into the redistricting process. I call these the strategic lessons. Issue 2 required state 
judges to monitor the appointment process for the commissioners. I propose to 
remove judges from the commissioner nomination process, keeping the process in 
the legislative branch. The courts should only review and certify the citizens 
commission’s electoral map.  
                                                                                                                                         
 9 However, two voters defeated two similar attempts at redistricting reform in 1981 and in 
2005. Jim Provance, Redistricting Issue Shows Sharp Ohio Divide, TOLEDO BLADE (Aug. 10, 
2012), http://www.toledoblade.com/Politics/2012/08/10/Redistricting-issue-shows-sharp-
Ohio-divide.html#4I8TRsbw8zWH7xMm.99. 
 10 A recent online Harris poll indicated citizens overwhelmingly preferred an independent 
redistricting commission “emphasizing geography over political affiliations,” lines over 
various partisan and bi-partisan options. Americans Across Party Lines Oppose Common 
Gerrymandering Practices, HARRIS INTERACTIVE, available at 
http://www.harrisinteractive.com/NewsRoom/HarrisPolls/tabid/447/mid/1508/articleId/1311/c
tl/ReadCustom%20Default/Default.aspx (last visited Jan. 31, 2014). The split between 
Democrats (52% favoring the independent commission) and Republicans (50%) was slim, 
with 26% of the total polled not sure or having no opinion on redistricting. Id. 
 11 Any criticism of Ohio’s gerrymandered districts must be taken with a grain of salt; 
Republicans were the architects of the map and could have easily included bipartisan 
requirements Still, Jon Husted, the Republican Secretary of State and respondent in the Voters 
First litigation, was publically critical of the state’s redistricting process well after Issue 2’s 
defeat. Jim Siegel, Husted Says He's Ready to Help Lawmakers Find New Map Process, 
COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Jan. 11, 2012), http://dispatchpolitics.dispatch.com/content/blogs/the-
daily-briefing/2012/01/1-11-12-husted-redistrict.html. 
 12 Guillen, supra note 1. 
 13 Issue 2 only carried one county: Athens, a county outside of Charlestown, West 
Virginia, where voters approved Issue 2 by 50.83%. Athens overwhelmingly voted to reelect 
President Obama (65.4%), Senator Sherrod Brown (63.1%), and other Democratic candidates. 
2012 General Election Results, OHIO SEC’Y OF STATE, available at 
http://www.sos.state.oh.us/SOS/elections/Research/electResultsMain/2012Results.aspx (last 
visited Jan. 31, 2014). Issue 2 performed worst in the rural northwest counties, Shelby 
(17.7%), Holmes (19.1%), Mercer (19.6%) and Putnam (19.7%), gaining less than a fifth of 
the voting share. Id. 
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Part IV addresses drafting mechanics that might help to solve some of Issue 2’s 
woes at the polls. Issue 2 was hampered in part by Ohio’s Secretary of State’s draft 
of the ballot question that was legally deficient and probably politically motivated. 
But my larger point is that, given the state of Ohio referendum law, drafters of any 
future redistricting referendum should deprive the Secretary or any other actors of 
opportunities to oppose it, by keeping their measure simple and strategically well 
designed. I propose to simplify the referendum, to ensure that a future ballot question 
is easy to summarize.  
Here, I propose three changes to a future referendum, based on public reaction to 
Issue 2. First, the ballot language was too long, in large part because the process for 
nominating citizens commissioners was convoluted. I propose to reduce the text to 
approximately 500 words. Second, Issue 2 contained extensive references to funding. 
I propose a hard cap on the citizens commission’s funding, to avoid charges of 
unaccountable spending. Third, Issue 2 did not provide commissioner accountability. 
I propose that commissioners should be removable for cause by a super majority of 
the legislature.  
With the strategic and tactical lessons in place, what does Issue 2 leave Ohio in 
terms of moving forward? In Part V, I marry my proposals with Issue 2. I strip away 
much of the text of Issue 2 in favor of a lean, simplified process. I conclude in Part V 
with the text of the model referendum. 
II. BACKGROUND 
“Ask not for whom the line is drawn; it is drawn to avoid thee.” 
   - Bernard Grofman14 
 
A. Ohio’s Redistricting Map 
“This plan is the most grotesque partisan gerrymander that I, as a political 
scientist, had ever seen,” said Richard Gunther, a Professor at Ohio State 
University.15 “It should either be rejected by the Ohio Senate or the courts, or 
overruled in a referendum by the citizens of this state, who deserve better.”16  
An outspoken advocate of election reform, and future co-author of Ohio Issue 
2,17 Gunther was testifying in front of the Ohio Senate Government Oversight and 
Reform Committee. His concern was the newly-released Ohio electoral map.18 
                                                                                                                                         
 14 Quoted in Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 636 (1993) (internal citations omitted).  
 15 Testimony Before the Ohio S. Gov’t Oversight and Reform Comm. (Sept. 20, 2011) 
(statement of Richard Gunther). 
 16 Id. 
 17 All Sides with Ann Fisher: 11:00 AM - Pros and Cons of Ohio Issue 2, THE OHIO 
CHANNEL (Oct. 31, 2012), available at 
http://www.ohiochannel.org/medialibrary/Media.aspx?fileId=137379. 
 18 Id. 
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol63/iss4/10
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Mistake on the Lake? Portions of Cleveland,
Sandusky, and Toledo were parceled together into
the sinewey Ohio Congressional District 9. As one
comedian remarked, “you pretty much have to
live at a reststop on I-90 or in a [ ] lighthouse to
live in this district.” Mike Polk, Ohio's Proposed
Redistricting is Shady Garbage, YOUTUBE,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qHG0N--
9B9U (last vistited Feb. 5, 2014). 
Gunther was not alone: 
Ohio’s 2011 proposed 
electoral map was gas 
poured on an already fiery 
national discourse.19 
Ohio was required to 
redistrict following the 2010 
census.20 The National 
Census revealed a mass 
exodus from the Rust Belt to 
the Sun Belt. Northern 
residents fled in record 
numbers, settling in the 
warm, affluent South and 
West. While the Unites 
States grew as a whole by 22 
million people between 
2000 and 2010 (a 9.7 
percent increase), over the 
same period Ohio grew an 
anemic 1.6 percent.21  
Based on the stagnating population, the Census Bureau reapportioned Ohio two 
fewer congressional seats, tying Pennsylvania for most House seats lost in the 2010 
reapportionment.22 Some Ohioans began to worry. The already red state was under 
Republican control. Conservative Governor Kasich could rely on a GOP-packed 
legislature to draw the new districts. Said one Democratic strategist in late 2010, “if 
I’m one of those Ohio Democratic incumbents, I’m worried. [Democrats] will 
absolutely lose a seat, period. End of story.”23 Political pundits predicted that the 
                                                                                                                                         
 19 See, e.g., Jamil Smith, Ohio Gerrymandering Costs Congress a Liberal, MSNBC (Mar. 
7, 2012), http://www.msnbc.com/melissa-harris-perry/ohio-gerrymandering-costs-congress-lib 
(describing the state’s 9th District as “an overcooked noodle”). 
 20 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (“[t]he actual Enumeration shall be made within three 
Years after the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every 
subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law direct. The Number of 
Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty Thousand.”). 
 21 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, C2010BR-01, POPULATION DISTRIBUTION AND CHANGE: 2000 TO 
2010 1–2 (Mar. 2011), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-
01.pdf. 
 22 KRISTIN D. BURNETT, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, C2010BR-08, CONGRESSIONAL 
APPORTIONMENT (Nov. 2011), available at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-08.pdf. 
 23 Robert Wang, 2010 Census—Ohio Population Up; Representation Down, CANTON REP 
(Dec. 22, 2010), http://www.cantonrep.com/news/x1882976261/2010-Census-Ohio-
population-up-but-representation-down?zc_p=0. 
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new electoral map would result in twelve staunchly Republican districts and four 
Democratic districts.24 
That is exactly what happened. Following the 2012 election, Republicans won 
twelve of sixteen seats.25 The races were hardly competitive. Only one Congressional 
race was within five points.26 Ten of the sixteen races were won by over twenty-
point margins, and two candidates ran unopposed.27 This was accomplished largely 
through the 2011 congressional election map: sixteen district boundaries drawn to 
ensure perpetual competitive advantages. Gerrymandering was working for 
Republicans in Ohio.28 
B. Partisan Gerrymandering: Sickness, Tradition, or Placebo? 
1. Single-Member Districts and Finding “Fairness” 
The Constitution provides for state legislatures to apportion representatives, 
subject to certain restrictions set by Congress.29 Behind closed doors, party leaders 
are free to carve out politically appetizing districts.30 These district lines rarely 
coincide with the natural topography of civil society. Instead, the lines are drawn to 
benefit a party or person at the expense of another. 
Gerrymandering has many forms. For the purposes of this Note, I restrict my 
discussion to partisan gerrymandering. Partisan gerrymandering is the process of 
drawing an electoral district in a manner that intentionally discriminates against a 
                                                                                                                                         
 24 Amanda Terkel, Ohio Redistricting Plan Likely to Give GOP 12 Out of 16 Seats, Create 
New Democratic District, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 13, 2011), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/13/ohio-redistricting-kucinich_n_959904.html. 
 25 2012 Election Results: Official Results for 2012 General Election Ohio, OHIO SEC’Y OF 
STATE, available at 
http://www.sos.state.oh.us/SOS/elections/Research/electResultsMain/2012Results.aspx. 
 26 Republican Jim Renacci defeated Democrat Betty Sutton by nearly 15,000 votes, 
52.05% to 47.95%. Id. However, Sutton was a three-term Congresswoman forced to compete 
against the incumbent Renacci in the newly formed 16th District. Sabrina Eaton, Rep. Jim 
Renacci Defeats Rep. Betty Sutton in Redrawn Congressional District; David Joyce, Marcy 
Kaptur also Win, PLAIN DEALER (Nov. 07, 2012), 
http://www.cleveland.com/open/index.ssf/2012/11/rep_jim_renacci_defeats_rep_be.html. 
 27 2012 Election Results, supra note 25. 
 28 The equally unappealing side-effect of gerrymandering is creating highly concentrated 
minority districts, as Democrats are “packed” into dark blue districts. Ohio’s Democratic races 
are no more competitive than the Republican districts. Id.  
 29 Specifically, Article I, section 4. “The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections 
for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; 
but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the 
Places of choosing Senators.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. 
 30 The Constitution does not prescribe that states are divided into districts. That 
requirement came from various statutes passed by Congress that required single-member 
districts. See Redistricting and the United States Constitution, THE DIANE REHM SHOW (Mar. 
22, 2011) (interview with Thomas E. Mann, Sean O'Brien and Nate Persily), available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/interviews/2011/03/22-redistricting-mann. 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol63/iss4/10
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political party.31 It generally serves two distinct interests: to displace incumbents and 
to distribute seats to favor the gerrymandering party.32 The traditional method of 
gerrymandering includes “packing” and “cracking” the opposing party.33 “Packing” 
involves drawing a district so as to concentrate a high majority of the opposing party 
voters into a single district.34 The remaining opposition is then “cracked”—dispersed 
across multiple districts where the gerrymandering party is sure to have a majority.35  
For better or worse, partisan gerrymandering is an American tradition. It predates 
the republic. Our founding fathers were not immune from the temptation: Patrick 
Henry allegedly attempted to gerrymander James Wilson out of the First Congress.36 
The term “gerrymander” itself dates to the late eighteenth century, when 
Massachusetts Governor Elbridge Gerry stitched together a hodgepodge collection of 
townships north of Boston, which was lampooned in a famous political cartoon 
making it look like a salamander.37 The name stuck.38 
Gerrymandering is uniquely controversial.39 Speaking empirically, it is 
impossible to describe the failures of gerrymandered districts, because it is equally 
impossible to describe an ideally apportioned district. In the words of one author, “it 
may be that capturing the essence of fair representation is as futile as trying to collect 
fog in a mason jar.”40  
Today, the popular perception of “fair” political representation is the single-
member electoral district. Single-member districts contain a set population. They are 
areas drawn (and periodically re-drawn) to maintain a population equal to the share 
of a single representative—that district then elects a single candidate to serve on its 
behalf.41 But this was not always the case. Until the mid-1800s, county lines or other 
                                                                                                                                         
 31 THE NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATORS, REDISTRICTING LAW 2010 115 (2010), 
available at http://redistrictingonline.org/uploads/Redistrictinglaw2010.pdf [hereinafter 
REDISTRICTING LAW]. 
 32 Bruce E. Cain & Janet C. Campagna, Predicting Partisan Redistricting Disputes, 12 
LEGIS. STUD. Q. 265, 268 (1987) (“Partisan fights over redistricting usually center on two 
issues: incumbent displacement and partisan reconstruction of the seats.”). 
 33 Adam B. Cox & Richard T. Holden, Reconsidering Racial and Partisan 
Gerrymandering, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 553, 565 (2011). 
 34 The effect is a tradeoff—a guaranteed opposition seat for the benefit of thinning the 
opposition in nearby districts. Id. at 561. 
 35 Id. at 562. 
 36 Id. at 557-58. 
 37 GARY W. COX & JONATHAN N. KATZ, ELBRIDGE GERRY’S SALAMANDER: THE 
ELECTORAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION 3 (2002).  
 38 Id. With apologies to the readers: recounting the tale of Elbridge Gerry is a sine qua non 
of the modern redistricting literature. 
 39 CHARLES S. BULLOCK III, REDISTRICTING: RACIAL AND PARTISAN CONSIDERATIONS, LAW 
AND ELECTION POLITICS: THE RULES OF THE GAME 230 (Matthew J. Streb ed., 2d ed. 2013). 
 40 CHRISTOPHER BURKE, THE APPEARANCE OF EQUALITY: RACIAL GERRYMANDERING, 
REDISTRICTING, AND THE SUPREME COURT vii (1999). 
 41 James A. Gardner, Foreword: Representation Without Party: Lessons from State 
Constitutional Attempts to Control Gerrymandering, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 881, 900 (2006). Based 
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municipal subdivisions were the predominate boundaries for electoral districts. But 
these local political boundaries inadequately accounted for population growth and 
migration.42 Ballooning urban areas either qualified for multiple representatives or 
were left underrepresented.43 States flip-flopped between subdividing their cities into 
single-member districts and allowing multi-member representation for high-
population counties.44 
A major shift in representation occurred with the passage of the Apportionment 
Act of 1842.45 This Act required states to establish single-member electoral 
districts.46 Although applicable only to Congressional seats, single member districts 
eventually pervaded state constitutions as the standard for establishing electoral 
boundaries.47 The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently affirmed single-member 
districts (or multi-member districts with the equivalent population-per-seat) as the 
normative standard for equal representation,48 often called the “one person, one vote” 
requirement.49 Although the use of single-member districts still attracts criticism, the 
winner-take-all system is entrenched in American electoral law.50 But the arbitrary 
                                                                                                                                         
on the 2010 census, the apportionment of citizens to congressional representative is 710,767; 
thus, federal congressional districts will contain approximately this many people. U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, APPORTIONMENT DATA, available at 
http://www.census.gov/2010census/data/apportionment-data-text.php (last visited Jan. 30, 
2015). The relative population per representative in state government, however, varies 
significantly. For instance, California’s legislature is comprised of 40 senators and 80 
representatives, while New Hampshire has 24 senators and 400 representatives. CAL. CONST. 
art. IV, § 2; N.H. CONST. art IX.  The result is that there are 465,674 residents per state 
representative in California and 3,291 in New Hampshire. Population represented by state 
legislatures, BALLOTPEDIA, available at 
http://ballotpedia.org/Population_represented_by_state_legislators (last visited Feb.12, 2015). 
 42 Gardner, supra note 41, at 905. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. at 912-13. 
 45 Apportionment Act of 1842, ch. 47, § 2, 5 Stat. 491. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Although the Court has upheld the constitutionality of multi-member districts, see, e.g., 
City of Mobile, Ala. v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66 (1980), it has done so reluctantly, largely 
favoring single-member districts for state legislative bodies. See Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 
1, 19 (1975) (“Absent particularly pressing features calling for multimember districts, a 
United States district court should refrain from imposing them upon a State.”). Justice 
O’Connor worried “the at-large or multimember district [had] an inherent tendency to 
submerge the votes of the minority.” Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 87 (1986) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring).  
 49 J. GERALD HERBERT, PAUL M. SMITH, MARTINA E. VANDENBERG & MICHAEL B. 
DESANCTIS, THE REALIST’S GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING: AVOIDING THE LEGAL PITFALLS 1 (2d 
ed. 2010). 
 50 For example, proponents of proportional representation believe that representation 
based on the percentage of a party’s vote share would provide minorities roughly equal 
representation in comparison to their demographic share. MARK MONMONIER, BUSHMANDERS 
& BULLWINKLES 138–41 (2001) [hereinafter MONMONIER, BUSHMANDERS]; Michael A. 
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boundaries of the single-member electoral district allowed legislatures to 
gerrymander the electorate.51  
There is considerable debate, and little consensus, over the effect of 
gerrymandering on the composition or functionality of government. Although 
commonly blamed for promoting polarization, empirical proof is elusive. Political 
scientists have pointed out that there is a lack of evidence linking gerrymandering to 
political division—gerrymandering might have little to do with the perceived 
partisan divide.52 Others have gone further, advocating that partisan gerrymandering 
is a traditional spoil to the victors of an election, one that provides stability and 
accountability in governance.53 Still others claim that gerrymandering may promote 
federalism by advancing state interests.54 
The injustice of partisan gerrymandering is hard to identify. The notion that a 
political party is “unfairly” securing seats disproportionate to their share of the 
general electorate is the most common notion of its inequality.55 By operating a 
winner-take-all system, single-member districts give minority politics a faint voice.56 
Even the most sensitively designed district must lay a line somewhere. Of course, if 
gerrymandering can be said to impair a certain group’s representational opportunity, 
                                                                                                                                         
McCann, A Vote Cast; A Vote Counted: Quantifying Voting Rights Through Proportional 
Representation in Congressional Elections, 12-Fall KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 191, 193 (2002). 
 51 “It is ironic that [the Apportionment Act of 1842], enacted originally at least in part to 
put a stop to one kind of very potent manipulation of the rules of representation, created the 
conditions that today enable a very different kind of manipulation.” Gardner, supra note 41, at 
913. 
 52 See, e.g., Nolan McCarty et al., Does Gerrymandering Cause Polarization?, 53 AM. J. 
POL. SCI. No. 3 666 (2009); Nolan McCarty, Hate Our Polarized Politics? Why You can’t 
Blame Gerrymandering, WASH. POST (Oct. 26, 2012), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/hate-our-polarized-politics-why-you-cant-blame-
gerrymandering/2012/10/26/c2794552-1d80-11e2-9cd5-b55c38388962_story.html. 
 53 Peter H. Shuck, The Thickest Thicket: Partisan Gerrymandering and Judicial 
Regulation of Politics, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1325, 1350 (1987) (“[A] victory bonus may be an 
essential technique for promoting effective governance in a markedly decentralized political 
system that always skirts the dangers of excessive fragmentation and destabilizing fluidity. 
Citizens and parties may prefer the stability, power aggregation, and accountability to voters 
that a victory bonus encourages.”). 
 54 Franita Tolson, Partisan Gerrymandering as a Safeguard of Federalism, 2010 UTAH L. 
REV. 859, 862 (2010) (“[Partisan gerrymandering] has the potential to protect the states' 
regulatory authority and increase their capacity for self-government in the face of expanding 
federal power. When states gerrymander congressional districts pursuant to their power under 
the Elections Clause, they are in fact furthering the federalism embodied in the Clause when 
the gerrymandering results in the election of congressional representatives that are responsive 
to state interests.”). 
 55 See, e.g., Gary King & Robert X. Browning, Democratic Representation and Partisan 
Bias in Congressional Elections, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1251, 1251-52 (1987) (“Partisan bias 
introduces asymmetry into the seats-votes relationship, resulting in an unfair partisan 
differential in the ability to win legislative seats: the advantaged party will be able to receive a 
larger number of seats for a fixed number of votes than will the disadvantaged party.”). 
 56 MARK E. RUSH, DOES REDISTRICTING MAKE A DIFFERENCE? 4 (1993).  
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then that presupposes strong and identifiable groups of voters exist and can be 
identified with a certain degree of accuracy.57  
For the purpose of this Note, it is not necessary to endorse a particular view of 
partisan gerrymandering. Whatever the consequences of gerrymandering, there is no 
debate that it occurs.58 Perhaps it is enough that gerrymandering offends a general 
idea of fairness. As one commentator said: 
[t]o many, gerrymandering, aside from resulting in oddly shaped electoral 
districts and thus perhaps providing an aesthetic affront, also seems 
ethically unsavory, smacking vaguely of self-dealing. Why should 
legislators be able to make the rules and then have an advantage in the 
resulting game? In drawing district lines, legislators are stacking the deck 
in their favor.59 
2. Form, Void, and Rorschach Tests: How to Draw a District60 
If the notion of an ideally apportioned single-member district is, at best, 
ambiguous, the manageable standards for drawing such a district are equally vague. 
While many theories exist, the Supreme Court has recognized four traditional 
principles: (1) contiguity, (2) compactness, (3) respect for political subdivisions, and 
(4) communities defined by actual shared interests.61 Ohio Issue 2 specifically called 
for these four factors plus (5) representational fairness and (6) competitive districts.62 
                                                                                                                                         
 57 Even a certain group’s predominate party affiliation, if it can be accurately accounted, is 
a poor predictor of that groups’ voting trends. Id. at 5–6, 41–42. 
 58 In fact, the evolution of G.I.S. and other geospatial statistical modeling has arguably 
made gerrymandering far more “efficient” than in the past. See generally MONMONIER, 
BUSHMANDERS, supra note 50. 
 59 McCarty et al., supra note 52, at 12. 
 60 Opining on the odd shapes of congressional districts, Business Insider offered readers to 
guess whether a blackened image was an electoral districts or inkblot. “The results aren't 
easily distinguishable from a Rorschach inkblot.” Walter Hickey, QUIZ: Gerrymandered 
GOP Congressional District or Rorschach Inkblot, BUSINESS INSIDER (Oct. 1, 2013), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/quiz-gerrymandered-gop-congressional-district-or-rorschach-
inkblot-2013-10?op=1#ixzz2sHfsTzo7. 
 61 This is not to say that these four factors carry any precedential weight at all in any 
future attempts to challenge partisan gerrymandering. These factors are described in Miller v. 
Johnson, a case of racially motivated redistricting. 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring). In Miller, Justice O’Connor sought to prescribe judicially-manageable standards 
for “traditional, race-neutral” redistricting. Id. These factors are irrelevant in political 
gerrymandering cases, as the question remains nonjusticiable. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 
267, 317 (2004) (“The failings of the many proposed standards for measuring the burden a 
gerrymander imposes on representational rights make our intervention improper.”). 
Notwithstanding, all four are “traditional” accepted standards, and therefore were natural to 
include in Issue 2. 
 62 Besides continuity and adherence to political subdivisions, Issue 2 enumerated the 
following factors: 
1. Community preservation - minimizes the number of governmental units that must 
be divided between different districts, by combining the areas of whole governmental 
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But again, as there is no need to choose among normative goals for 
representativeness, there also is no need to choose among guiding principles to meet 
it. Instead, I defer to the judgment of the drafters of Issue 2—which included a 
collection the nation’s preeminent election law scholars—and instead briefly discuss 
the six principles prescribed therein. 
a. Contiguity 
Contiguity is a nearly universal requirement for redistricting bodies.63 To achieve 
contiguity, a district must be reachable from every other part without crossing a 
district boundary.64 Functionally, the district should be a single, undivided tract of 
land.65 Due to its simplicity, contiguity is typically a noncontroversial requirement.66  
b. Compactness 
Attempting to suggest a formal definition for compactness, one academic noted, 
“is a bit like pornography—although we know it when we see it, individual 
sensitivities and community standards vary widely.”67 Although compactness is a 
                                                                                                                                         
units giving preference in the order named to counties, municipalities, contiguous 
townships, and city wards. 
 
2. Competitiveness - maximizes the number of politically balanced districts. A 
“politically balanced district” is a district where the average political party indexes, 
determined using actual election results from recent representative statewide elections, 
does not lean toward one party by more than five percent. 
 
3. Representational fairness - balances the number of districts leaning toward each 
political party so that the number of districts leaning toward each party closely 
corresponds to the preferences of the voters of Ohio, as determined using actual 
election results from recent representative statewide elections. 
 
4. Compactness - creates districts that are compact.  
2012 OHIO ISSUE 2, OHIO BALLOT BD., available at 
http://www.sos.state.oh.us/sos/upload/ballotboard/2012/2-fulltext.pdf [hereinafter ISSUE 2 
FULL TEXT]. 
 63 MARK E. RUSH & RICHARD L ENGSTROM, FAIR AND EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION? 20 
(2001) [hereinafter RUSH, FAIR REPRESENTATION?]. 
 64 Bernard Grofman, Criteria for Districting: A Social Science Perspective, 33 UCLA L. 
REV. 77, 84 (1985). 
 65 Some leeway exists, such as connecting land separated by water. Id. 
 66 Id. But the Court has questioned the practical conformance of some “technically” 
contiguous districts. In Shaw v. Reno, the Court invalidated a North Carolina majority-black 
district that was “approximately 160 miles long and, for much of its length, no wider than the 
I–85 corridor. It winds in snakelike fashion through tobacco country, financial centers, and 
manufacturing areas until it gobbles in enough enclaves of black neighborhoods.” 509 U.S. 
630, 635-36 (1993). 
 67 MONMONIER, BUSHMANDERS, supra note 50, at 64. 
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frequent requirement for electoral districts, it is rarely articulated.68 Various 
mathematical models exist to measure relative traits such as perimeter, dispersion, 
and area.69 But compactness is generally the least technical of district requirements. 
Unlike the contours of racial or ethnic lines, which require a certain knowledge of a 
place, judges can “see” compactness on the map and when a district makes sense 
spatially.70 This is not to suggest that districts are drawn in perfect circles or squares. 
Compactness should be balanced against the natural and social topography. Districts 
that follow the contours of highways, rivers, and lakes are bound to score low in 
mathematical models, but are certainly better designed for community 
inclusiveness.71 Leave should be granted to stretch or skew shapes to place areas of 
concentrated population closer to the center of a district, instead of at the fringe.72 
Compactness is useful because it suggests an attempt at community inclusion, as 
strained boundaries suggest devious intent.73 
c. Political Subdivisions 
Political subdivisions provide nicely established lines for electoral districts to 
follow. First, political boundaries—incorporated cities, townships, county lines, 
school districts and the like—are easy to identify.74 Second, local units of 
governments, especially counties, have historically served as the base electoral 
district.75 In Davis v. Bandemer, the Court granted political subdivisions the same 
                                                                                                                                         
 68 Eighteen states require compactness. Who Draws the Lines? ALL ABOUT 
REDISTRICTING, LOYOLA LAW SCHOOL, http://redistricting.lls.edu/who-courtfed10.php (last 
visited Jan. 31, 2014). 
 69 MONMONIER, BUSHMANDERS, supra note 50, at 64-65. 
 70 This was apparent to Justice Stevens, who needed no mathematical analysis to form an 
opinion on three districts upheld by the plurality in Bush v. Vera.  
The plurality offers mathematical proof that District 30 is one of the most bizarre 
districts in the Nation and relates the now-obligatory florid description of the district's 
shape. As the maps appended to this opinion demonstrate, neither District 30 nor the 
Houston districts have a monopoly on either of these characteristics. Three other 
majority-white districts are ranked along with the majority-minority districts as among 
the oddest in the Nation. 
517 U.S. 952, 1018-19 (1996) (Stevens, J. dissenting). 
 71 Id. at 72. 
 72 Id. at 73-74. 
 73 Id. at 70. In cases of alleged racial discrimination, a district’s shape might provide 
strong circumstantial evidence of racially-motivated intent. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 
913 (1995). 
 74 RUSH, FAIR REPRESENTATION?, supra note 63, at 24. 
 75 Id. 
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weight afforded to contiguity and compactness.76 The crisscrossing of political 
boundaries was a major factor in invalidating districts in Shaw77 and Miller.78  
But the inclusion of political subdivisions has its problems. There is little 
consensus on what type of political subdivision to preserve.79 Many political 
boundaries are fluid. For instance, city boundaries may grow or contract year-over-
year.80 When a county or city must be split, there is no normative standard on the 
best method to divide the pie.81 The political subdivision itself might contradict other 
redistricting principles—the inclusion of oddly shaped municipalities could affect a 
district’s compactness or continuity.82  
d. Communities of Shared Interests83 
Of the four traditional principles, the requirement that communities are defined 
by an actual and shared interest is the hardest to quantify. It is commonly understood 
that “[d]istricts are preferably more than arbitrary aggregations of individuals.”84 
And protecting communities of shared interests might be the core, if not admittedly 
impossible, goal of redistricting.85 But defining communities of shared interests, and 
                                                                                                                                         
 76 “The most important of these factors are the shapes of voting districts and adherence to 
established political subdivision boundaries.” Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 173 (1986). 
 77 “Of the 10 counties through which District 12 passes, 5 are cut into 3 different 
districts.” Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 636 (1993). 
 78 “Effingham and Chatham Counties were split to make way for the Savannah extension, 
which itself split the City of Savannah; and the plan as a whole split 26 counties.” Miller, 515 
U.S. at 908. 
 79 “Political subdivisions come in many forms: counties, parishes, cities, towns, school 
districts, judicial districts, water districts, etc.” Nathaniel Persily, When Judges Carve 
Democracies: A Primer on Court-Drawn Redistricting Plans, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1131, 
1155–56 (2005). 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. at 1160. (“For example, if one is forced to choose between splitting one county into 
five districts or two counties each into two districts, which decision should one make?”); see 
also Lawyer v. Dep’t of Justice, 521 U.S. 567, 581 (1997) (upholding Florida electoral district 
that crossed a body of water and expanded across three counties because “evidence submitted 
showed that both features are common characteristics of Florida legislative districts, being 
products of the State's geography and the fact that 40 Senate districts are superimposed on 67 
counties.”).  
 82 Id. 
 83 While the Supreme Court has never formally extended the communities of interest 
principle to partisan gerrymandering cases, the Supreme Court has never ruled out its 
inclusion. See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Redistricting and the Territorial Community, 160 
U. PA. L. REV. 1379, 1421–22 (2012). 
 84 RUSH, FAIR REPRESENTATION?, supra note 63, at 25. 
 85 See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993) (“A reapportionment plan that 
includes in one district individuals who belong to the same race, but who are otherwise widely 
separated by geographical and political boundaries, and who may have little in common with 
one another but the color of their skin, bears an uncomfortable resemblance to political 
apartheid.”). 
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properly identifying them, is an inherently subjective task. Asked one elections 
scholar, “[a]re communities of interest defined by ideology, demographic traits, 
economic concerns, policy priorities, or some combination thereof? The Supreme 
Court, for its part, has not answered this question.”86 In Miller, the Court prohibited 
the “mere recital” of communal interest, but provided no more in the way of 
constructing judicially manageable standards.87 Because the principle is so elusive, 
many courts afford little weight to communal interests.88 Only a small minority of 
state legislatures has included “shared interests” as a component requirement.89  
e. Representational Fairness and Competitive Districts 
Aside from the above four considerations announced in Miller, Issue 2 included 
two more. First, Issue 2 called for politically competitive districts. Issue 2 defined 
“competitive” as no more than five percent disparity between political parties in a 
given district.90 The data used to measure party affiliation was based on the average 
political party indexes from recent elections.91 This principle of construction would 
prevent “stacking” of a party in a certain district. Second, Issue 2 also called for 
“representational fairness.” This requirement is perhaps more vague, requiring that, 
on “balance,” districts leaning toward one party or another “closely corresponds to 
the preferences of the voters of Ohio, as determined using actual election results 
from recent representative statewide elections.”92  
These principles speak to notions of competitive fairness,93 both inside a given 
district and statewide.94 Issue 2 defined the source (the political party indexes from 
recent elections) and measure (5% deviation) of establishing competitiveness in a 
given district, eliminating the potential for courts to invalidate the requirement as 
judicially unmanageable.95 Justice O’Connor, dissenting in Davis v. Bandemer, 
                                                                                                                                         
 86 Todd Makse, Defining Communities of Interest in Redistricting Through Initiative 
Voting, 11 ELECTION L.J. 503, 504 (2012). 
 87 Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 919 (1995). 
 88 See, e.g., Chen v. City of Houston, 206 F.3d 502, 517 (5th Cir. 2000) (“Because of the 
inherently subjective nature of the concept, it would seem that reasonable people might 
disagree as to what constitutes a community. We thus caution against general over-reliance on 
the communities of interest factor.”). 
 89 REDISTRICTING LAW, supra note 31, at 106–8. 
 90 ISSUE 2 FULL TEXT, supra note 62. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. 
 93 However, the notion of competitive districts and proportional representation assumes 
that voters are easily identified. Unlike race, political identity is not an immutable 
characteristic. See RUSH, supra note 56, at 4. 
 94 For a critique of competitive district requirements, see Justin Buchler, Competition, 
Representation and Redistricting: The Case Against Competitive Congressional Districts, 17 
J. THEORETICAL POL. 431 (2005) (arguing that competitive districts widen the ideological 
differences between the median constituent and the representative).  
 95 The inability to accurately ascertain the voter strengths of a given party was one reason 
a plurality of the Supreme Court found partisan gerrymandering was nonjusticiable. Vieth v. 
Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 268 (2004) (“There is no effective way to ascertain a party's majority 
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conceded that this type competitive representation requirement was manageable in 
some instances.96 Said Justice O’Connor,  
[O]f course, in one sense a requirement of proportional representation, 
whether loose or absolute, is judicially manageable. If this Court were to 
declare that the Equal Protection Clause required proportional 
representation within certain fixed tolerances, I have no doubt that district 
courts would be able to apply this edict.97 
3. Bandemer, Vieth and the Ebb of Judicial Activism in Redistricting 
The United States Constitution grants both state legislatures and Congress the 
authority to enact sweeping anti-gerrymandering reform.98 Perhaps in large part 
because they reap the fruit of gerrymandered districts, legislatures have been 
reluctant to impose strict checks and balances on the redistricting process.99 Thus, 
disenfranchised voters often turn to the courts for relief. But for nearly two hundred 
years, courts declined to tackle partisan gerrymandering challenges, holding partisan 
gerrymandering questions as nonjusticiable.100  
In 1962, the Supreme Court first breached the issue of redistricting in Baker v. 
Carr.101 Allowing a challenge to a Tennessee districting plan, the Baker Court found 
                                                                                                                                         
status, and, in any event, majority status in statewide races does not establish majority status 
for particular district contests.”). Further, without a normative standard to judge, a 
requirement for competitive districts becomes a subjective analysis in fairness, where 
“[f]airness is not a judicially manageable standard.” Id. at 268 (internal quotations omitted). It 
is likely courts would defer to examine fairness in any depth beyond whether the statutory 
statistical requirements were met. For instance, in Gafney v. Cummings, the Court deferred to 
a political fairness principle, ruling:  
[J]udicial interest should be at its lowest ebb when a State purports fairly to allocate 
political power to the parties in accordance with their voting strength and, within quite 
tolerable limits, succeeds in doing so. . . neither we nor the district courts have a 
constitutional warrant to invalidate a state plan, otherwise within tolerable population 
limits, because it undertakes, not to minimize or eliminate the political strength of any 
group or party, but to recognize it and, through districting, provide a rough sort of 
proportional representation in the legislative halls of the State. 
412 U.S. 735, 754 (1973). 
 96 Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 158 (1986) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 97 Id.  
 98 See, e.g., Ariz. v. Inter-Tribal Council of Ariz., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2253 (2013) (“The 
Elections Clause has two functions. Upon the States it imposes the duty . . . to prescribe the 
time, place, and manner of electing Representatives and Senators; upon Congress it confers 
the power to alter those regulations or supplant them altogether.”). 
 99 The sole federal law remaining on the books today, 2 U.S.C. § 2c, only requires single-
member-districts. 
 100 In Vieth, Justice Scalia recounts two hundred years of anti-gerrymandering legislative 
history. Congress was surprisingly active through the early twentieth century, requiring 
district continuity, compactness, and equality of representation. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 274–77. 
 101 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
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that the question did not pose a purely political question,102 but instead fell into the 
“developed and familiar” judicial standards under the Equal Protection Clause.103 
Two years later, the Court expanded its gerrymandering jurisprudence, establishing 
the “one person, one vote” standard in Reynolds v. Sims.104 The Reynolds standard 
requires each district to have roughly the same population as every other district.105 
In Karcher v. Daggett, the Court clarified the Reynolds requirement, mandating 
states demonstrate a good faith effort to equally proportion voters across districts.106 
Under Karcher, a state must prove a conflicting, legitimate goal to overcome any 
significant population variance.107 The Karcher standard is a high one. Today, no 
state has a congressional population variance exceeding 1%,108 and only one state is 
above 0.5%.109 But Reynolds and Karcher only provided for numerically 
proportional representation. Neither directly addressed partisan gerrymandering. 
In Davis v. Bandemer the Court first held partisan redistricting challenges 
justiciable.110 Bandemer involved a challenge to an Indiana electoral map that was 
heavily weighted in favor of Republican candidates.111 Applying the test set forth in 
Baker v. Carr, the Court found that none of the impediments associated with 
political questions were present.112  
                                                                                                                                         
 102 “Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a 
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political 
department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or 
the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for 
nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution 
without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual 
need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of 
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.” 
Id. 
 103 Id. at 226. 
 104 377 U.S. 533, 565–66 (1964) (“Diluting the weight of votes because of place of 
residence impairs basic constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment just as much as 
invidious discriminations based upon factors such as race or economic status.”) (internal 
citations omitted). In Reynolds, the Court dealt (in part) with an act of “omission,” as the 
legislature created unbalanced districts through a failure to properly reapportion, rather than 
an affirmative act. BULLOCK III, supra note 39, at 231–32. For the purposes of this note, I deal 
only with acts of “commission,” or affirmative acts of malapportionment. Id. at 234. 
 105 “One person, one vote” established a judicially-manageable standard of “equal 
representation for equal numbers of people.” Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 730 (1983) 
(quoting Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964)). 
 106 Id. at 730–31. 
 107 Id. 
 108 HERBERT ET AL., supra note 49, at 6-7. 
 109 Idaho, at 0.6 percent. Id.  
 110 Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 113 (1986). 
 111 Id. at 132. 
 112 Id. 
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For the first time, the Supreme Court addressed partisan gerrymandering. A 
plurality of the Court held that to qualify for Fourteenth Amendment relief, two 
criteria must be met. First, it was necessary to demonstrate a legislative intent to 
discriminate against a certain political group.113 Second, the districting plan must be 
proven to have an actual discriminatory effect.114 The plurality decision made clear 
that intent was far easier to prove than effect.115 To demonstrate effect took more 
than recitals, or even proof of disproportionate representation. Instead, the 
discriminatory effect “occurs only when the electoral system is arranged in a manner 
that will consistently degrade a voter’s or group of voters’ influence on the political 
system as a whole.”116 Ultimately, based on insufficient evidence of discriminatory 
effect, the Court refused to overturn Indiana’s electoral map.117 “A group's electoral 
power is not unconstitutionally diminished by the simple fact of an apportionment 
scheme that makes winning elections more difficult, and a failure of proportional 
representation alone does not constitute impermissible discrimination under the 
Equal Protection Clause.”118 
Bandemer provided little in the way of guidance to lower courts. Decisions 
immediately following Bandemer suggested that the discriminatory effect test was a 
high, but elusive, standard. For instance, in Badham v Eu, a challenge to the 
California electoral map failed on judicial notice that Republicans, by holding the 
governorship, a Senate seat, and 40% of Congressional seats, were not “shut out” of 
the political process.119 Subsequent lower court decisions demonstrated similar 
difficulties applying Bandemer.120 “The Bandemer plurality's standard . . . proved 
unmanageable in application.”121 
Two decades later, in Vieth v. Jubelirer, a four-member plurality of the Court 
held that partisan gerrymandering cases were nonjusticable.122 The plurality decision 
                                                                                                                                         
 113 Id. at 127. 
 114 Id. 
 115 The plurality reasoned that “[a]s long as redistricting is done by a legislature, it should 
not be very difficult to prove that the likely political consequences . . . were intended.” Id. at 
129. 
 116 Id. at 132.  
 117 Id. at 113.  
 118 Id. 
 119 Badham v. March Fong Eu, 694 F. Supp. 664, 672 (N.D. Cal. 1988), aff’d sub nom. 
Perry v. Leeke,  488 U.S. 1024 (1989). 
 120 See, e.g., Republican Party of Va. v. Wilder, 774 F. Supp. 400, 404 (W.D. Va. 1991) 
(failure to prove intent); Pope v. Blue, 809 F. Supp. 392, 397 (W.D.N.C. 1992) (failure to 
include minority party in the redistricting process was not proof of consistent degradation in 
entire political process); Fund for Accurate & Informed Representation, Inc. v. Weprin, 796 F. 
Supp. 662, 669 (N.D.N.Y. 1992) (per curiam) aff’d 506 U.S. 1017 (1992) (mem.) (political 
party’s complete preclusion from one house in a bicameral legislature insufficient to prove 
foreclosure from whole political system). 
 121 Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 268 (2004). 
 122 Id. at 305–06. 
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cited the lack of judicially manageable standards.123 The long-standing disagreement 
over a workable standard of review was among the reasons that Baker v. Carr 
precluded judicial intervention. “For the past 18 years, the lower courts have simply 
applied the Bandemer plurality's standard, almost invariably producing the same 
result as would have obtained had the question been nonjusticiable: Judicial 
intervention has been refused.”124 Justice Kennedy, concurring in the decision but 
wishing to preserve the future justiciability of partisan gerrymandering claims, voted 
to dismiss for failure to state a claim.125 Three dissenting opinions claimed their own 
proposed standards were judicially manageable.126 Of course, each of the three 
dissents proposed a uniquely different test, a fact that spoke to the plurality’s 
position that the question posed an unworkable political question.  
In any case, Vieth actually left open the possibility of judicial intervention—a 
majority of the Court voted to retain the justiciability of partisan redistricting. Thus, 
it leaves the prospect of judicial action in gerrymandering cases very much up in the 
air. 
Following Vieth, some states turned to referendum to modify their redistricting 
processes. Referendum is an increasingly popular method to reform gridlocked 
partisanship. In 2008, California voters approved a citizens commission to draw state 
legislative boundaries.127 In 2010, voters extended the same system to Congressional 
boundaries.128 California’s method of taking redistricting out of the state legislature’s 
hand was noticed.129 Ohio citizens sought to achieve the same. On April 5th, 2012, 
the League of Women Voters, by and through Voters First Ohio, successfully 
                                                                                                                                         
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. at 267–68. 
 125 Id. at 306 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“I would not foreclose all possibility of judicial 
relief if some limited and precise rationale were found to correct an established violation of 
the Constitution in some redistricting cases.”). 
 126 Justice Stevens advocated for the court to apply the same standards to partisan 
gerrymandering as it did to racial gerrymandering. Id. at 336 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justices 
Souter and Ginsberg advocated a five-part test to establish a prima facie case of partisan 
gerrymandering. Id. at 347 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer, instead of offering a test, 
provided examples of “serious departures from redistricting norms,” that would lead to 
judicial recognition of partisan gerrymandering. Id. at 366–67 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 127 Gerry Shih, Tackling Redistricting With Money and Zeal, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2010, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/08/us/08bcredistrict.html?_r=0. 
 128 Id. This passed with 61 percent of the vote. CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE, BALLOT 
MEASURES PASSED, available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ballot-
measures/pdf/approval-percentages-initiatives.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2014). 
 129 With only one map drawn so far, California’s model has been both roundly praised as 
the model moving forward and thoroughly denounced as providing no added value. Compare 
Karin Mac Donald, Adventures in Redistricting: A Look at the California Redistricting 
Commission, 11 ELECTION L.J. 472, 489 (2012), with Anthony E. Chavez, The Red and Blue 
Golden State: Why California's Proposition 11 Will Not Produce More Competitive Elections, 
14 CHAP. L. REV. 311, 312 (2011). 
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petitioned Issue 2, a constitutional referendum, for November 2012 ballots.130 The 
question remained—would the Buckeye State go for it? 
C. The Rise of Referenda and Direct Democracy 
1. Referendum as a Progressive Movement 
Although its traditions are rooted as far back as the town meeting of colonial 
New England, as a practical matter, the referendum is a modern creation.131 Direct 
democracy grew out of the Progressive movement of the early twentieth century. 
The harsh economic transformation of America’s industrial society left many classes 
feeling unrepresented.132 Working-class Americans felt increasingly disenfranchised 
by a government catering to commercial interests.133 Contemporary observers wrote 
of the popular democratic “revolution” occurring overseas.134 Newspapers, articles, 
and essays opined on the benefits of popular referenda.135 By the mid-1890s, the 
American direct democracy movement gained traction.136 While New Jersey 
considered and rejected a referendum bill in 1894,137 South Dakota adopted the first 
such law in 1898, and over the next two decades, twenty two states followed suit, 
including Ohio.138 Today, a majority of the states provide their citizens some means 
of popular initiative.139 
Constitutions, statutes, and municipal charters now authorize a wide variety of 
direct democratic devices.140 Among the most common are initiatives and referenda. 
                                                                                                                                         
 130 Letter from the Ohio Ballot Board to Mike DeWine (Apr. 5, 2012), 
http://www.sos.state.oh.us/upload/news/2012/2012-04-05Redistricting.pdf (certifying Ohio 
Ballot Issue 2). 
 131 JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, THE REFERENDUM: THE PEOPLE DECIDE PUBLIC POLICY 2–3 
(2001). 
 132 STEVEN L. PIOTT, GIVING VOTERS A VOICE: THE ORIGINS OF THE INITIATIVE AND 
REFERENDUM IN AMERICA 1 (2003). 
 133 Id. 
 134 Specifically in Switzerland, where referendum were gaining widespread popularity. Id. 
at 4–5. 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. at 9–10.  
 137 Id. at 15. 
 138 THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, 
AND RECALL 51 (1989). 
 139 Twenty-eight states allow initiative or referendum. Those states are South Dakota 
(1898), Utah (1900), Oregon (1902), Montana (1906), Oklahoma (1907), Maine (1908), 
Missouri (1908), Colorado (1910), Arkansas (1910), Arizona (1911), California, (1911), New 
Mexico (1911 referendum only), Idaho (1912), Nebraska (1912), Nevada (1912 referendum 
only), Ohio (1912), Washington (1912), Michigan (1913), North Dakota (1914), Kentucky 
(1915 referendum only), Maryland (1915 referendum only), Massachusetts (1918), Alaska 
(1959), Wyoming (1968), Florida (1968 constitutional initiative only), Illinois (1970 
constitutional initiative only), District of Columbia (1977), Mississippi (1992). Id. 
 140 State referendum procedures vary from brief to very detailed. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 
131, at 21–22. 
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Initiatives allow voters to introduce a bill or constitutional amendment to the state 
legislature. Referenda allow voters to either approve a proposed law or constitutional 
amendment or to reject an existing law.141 In practice, the terms are often 
interchanged to suggest any ballot question tendered to voters.142 For instance, in 
Ohio Issue 2 was called an “initiated constitutional amendment,” even though it 
functioned much like a referendum.143  
The political theory of direct democracy is rife with controversy. The founding 
fathers trusted in a representational democracy, believing direct democracy 
impractical, undesirable, and dangerous.144 But the nature of representation is a 
debate that continues today. Two predominant but competing theories of 
representation frame the issue of popular referenda: the trustee model and the 
delegate model. Under the trustee model, elected representatives are independent 
agents, free to act as they please with no responsibility to carry out the will of the 
majority.145 If this is the case, direct democracy abridges the freedom of the tenant-
constituent relationship, vesting legislative power to the majority. In contrast, the 
delegate model views representatives as proxies of the people, duty bound to carry 
out the will of the majority.146 Referendum squares nicely with the delegate model. 
Delegate proponents believe popular initiative is a more efficient means of 
legislating, as the citizens are “representing” themselves.147 As one commentator put 
it, “[t]he dilemma is ancient and perhaps irresolvable.”148 
An enduring criticism of direct democracy is that it undermines the traditional 
representative democracy prescribed in the Constitution. As ratified, the Constitution 
hardly promoted the idea of direct democracy. The popular vote applied only to 
Congressional Representatives.149 Some legal scholars argue that direct democracy is 
unconstitutional under the Guarantee Clause.150 But the Supreme Court held 
otherwise over a century ago. In Pacific States Telephone v. State of Oregon, the 
Court ruled that the republican form of government was satisfied when the 
                                                                                                                                         
 141 CRONIN, supra note 138, at 2. 
 142 Ohio statute refers to ballot measures as “propositions, issues, or questions.” OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 3519.21 (West 2015).  
 143 BALLOT INITIATIVES, OHIO ATTORNEY GENERAL, available at 
http://www.ohioattorneygeneral.gov/Legal/Ballot-Initiatives (last visited Jan. 31, 2014). 
 144 CRONIN, supra note 138, at 22. 
 145 Id. at 26–27. 
 146 Id. 
 147 This discounts the advantages of openness, compromise, and information sharing in the 
governing process. See generally Bruce E. Cain & Kenneth P. Miller, The Populist Legacy: 
Initiatives and the Undermining of Representational Government, the Battle over Ballot 
Initiatives in America, in DANGEROUS DEMOCRACY? THE BATTLE OVER BALLOT INITIATIVES IN 
AMERICA 33 (Larry Sabato, Bruce A. Larson & Howard R. Ernst eds., 2001). 
 148 CRONIN, supra note 138, at 27. 
 149 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XII.  
 150 RICHARD J. ELLIS, DEMOCRATIC DELUSIONS: THE INITIATIVE PROCESS IN AMERICA 168 
(2002). 
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representatives and Senators were seated in Congress.151 Holding the question 
nonjusticiable,152 the Court has declined to revisit the issue, allowing states to 
continue to experiment with popular initiatives.153 
Legality aside, the potential drawbacks of direct democracy are well-
documented. Many political scientists question the competency of the electorate. For 
one, the average voter’s source of information is often incomplete or biased; many 
citizens base their knowledge of a referendum on sound bites, endorsements, and 
advertisements.154 Voters have historically performed poorly at identifying facts or 
substance of initiatives.155 Corporations and deep-pocketed interest groups can 
“kidnap” a referendum, promoting narrow interests not aligned with the general 
public welfare.156 Because ballot questions are often poorly drafted, and lack a 
supporting legislative record, courts are faced with the difficulty of interpreting 
vague, inconsistent, or contradictory laws.157 Referenda might be used by majorities 
to limit or rollback civil rights for unpopular minorities.158 Despite these shortfalls, 
the use of referenda has more than doubled in the past fifty years.159  
2. Referendum in Ohio 
An early leader in direct democracy, Ohio citizens have enjoyed referendum and 
initiative power for over a century.160 A hotbed of the Progressive movement of the 
turn of the twentieth century,161 Ohioans thought popular democracy a way to break 
industry’s stronghold on the state political machine and expand individual liberty.162 
                                                                                                                                         
 151 The Court went on to rule that the adoption of initiative was a political outside the scope 
of its jurisdiction. Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. State of Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 151 (1912). 
 152 Id. 
 153 CRONIN, supra note 138, at 34–35. 
 154 Elisabeth R. Gerber, The Logic of Reform: Assessing Initiative Reform Strategies, in 
DANGEROUS DEMOCRACY? THE BATTLE OVER BALLOT INITIATIVES IN AMERICA 156–57 (Larry 
Sabato, Bruce A. Larson & Howard R. Ernst eds., 2001). 
 155 Id. 
 156 See generally ELISABETH R. GERBER, THE POPULIST PARADOX: INTEREST GROUP 
INFLUENCE AND THE PROMISE OF DIRECT LEGISLATION (1999). 
 157 Zachary Hudson, Interpreting the Products of Direct Democracy, 28 YALE L. & POL’Y 
REV. 223, 224 (Fall 2009). 
 158 Stephen Shapiro, The Referendum Process in Maryland: Balancing Respect for 
Representative Government with the Right to Direct Democracy, 44 U. BALT. L.F. 1, 6–7 
(2013). 
 159 Howard R. Ernst, The Historical Role of Narrow-Material Interests in Initiative 
Politics, in DANGEROUS DEMOCRACY? THE BATTLE OVER BALLOT INITIATIVES IN AMERICA 21 
(Larry Sabato, Bruce A. Larson & Howard R. Ernst eds., 2001). 
 160 The Ohio constitutional amendments were incorporated in 1912. PIOTT, supra note 132, 
at 184.  
 161 Early ballot issues included eligibility of women to hold certain offices (1913), 
women’s suffrage (1914 and 1917), term limits (1915), and the grant of referendum to ratify 
Constitutional Amendments. Id. at 282–83. 
 162 Id. at 170. 
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Tellingly, it was not the legislature, but the constitutional convention that proposed 
the referendum and initiative amendment in 1912.163 As early as 1913, Ohio citizens 
began to certify questions ranging from prohibition laws to property taxes.164 
Between 1913 and 2000, Ohio had certified 199 state-wide initiatives for the 
ballot, averaging 2.3 initiatives per year.165 During this time, 108 passed (54%).166 
The rate and success of recent initiatives closely follow historical trends. Between 
2001 and 2012, the state averaged 2.4 initiatives per year, certifying twenty-six 
initiatives, of which thirteen passed (50%).167  
Although Ohio initiatives historically enjoy a slightly greater than 50/50 chance 
at the poll, those questions certified by direct citizen petition fair relatively poorly. 
Of Ohio’s 225 statewide initiatives, 153 were drafted and certified to voters by the 
General Assembly.168 Only seventy-two questions were initiated by citizen 
petition.169 While voters have passed 67% of General Assembly initiates, only 26% 
of citizen-initiated questions ever become law.170 Recent trends show marginal 
improvement. Since 2000, voters approved five of fifteen (33%) citizen-initiated 
questions, compared to three of eight (38%) of General Assembly-initiated 
questions.171 
Despite the historically low success rate of citizen-initiated referenda, 
referendum remains a viable—and perhaps best—option for Ohio redistricting 
reform. It is highly unlikely that the General Assembly would support a redistricting 
measure similar in scope to Issue 2, much less a constitutional amendment. A 
referendum measure would force permanent reform. California and Arizona 
successfully implemented new redistricting systems via referendum. Even in 
California, where the use of direct democracy is widely popular,172 voters approve 
only a minority of questions.173 Arizona, the same.174 Nothing suggests that Ohio is a 
less-ripe environment for a successful referendum. 
                                                                                                                                         
 163 Id. at 183–84. 
 164 Id. at 282–83. 
 165 PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS, INITIATED LEGISLATION, AND LAWS 
CHALLENGED BY REFERENDUM, SUBMITTED TO THE ELECTORS, OHIO SEC’Y OF STATE (June 11, 
2014), http://www.sos.state.oh.us/sos/upload/elections/historical/issuehist.pdf. 
 166 Of those 199 initiatives, 57 were citizen initiated and 142 were submitted to voters by 
the General Assembly. Id. 
 167 This includes Issue 2. Id. 
 168 Id. 
 169 Id. 
 170 Id. 
 171 Id. 
 172 See, e.g., Stephen M. Griffin, California Constitutionalism: Trust in Government and 
Direct Democracy, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 551, 569 (2009). 
 173 Between 1912 and 2012, voters approved 122 of 360 (34%) initiatives. INITIATIVES 
TOTAL SUMMARY, CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ballot-
measures/pdf/initiative-totals-summary-year.pdf. 
 174 Between 1912 and 2000, Arizona passed 63 of 105 (42%) initiatives. ARIZONA 
STATEWIDE INITIATIVE USAGE, THE INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM INST., 
 
22https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol63/iss4/10
2015] REDISTRICTING REFORM THROUGH REFERENDUM 923 
 
There is one other consideration worth merit. While opinions are divided on 
direct democracy tools such as referendum, initiative, and recall, there is a general 
consensus that state constitutional amendments should be submitted directly to the 
voters.175 Issue 2 packaged amendments, annulments, and changes to the Ohio 
Constitution. Although the Ohio Constitution provides various means for 
amendment,176 one of those is popular referendum.177  
While means exist to reform redistricting by the courts (via judicial review), the 
state legislature (via statute), or Congress (via the express terms of Article 1),178 it 
can safely be argued that a state constitutional change is the most direct, efficient 
means of attaining the same. Given the political disincentive to reform, along with 
the law’s unwillingness to hear citizen complaints, direct citizen action is the only 
feasible corrective action now. 
D. A Note on Redistricting Commissions 
Ohio Voters First was an initiative of the Ohio League of Women Voters as a 
response to the gerrymandered congressional map certified by the Ohio General 
Assembly in 2011. Despite conservative criticism, Voters First was neither 
haphazard nor idealistic. Nor was it a trivial academic exercise: the venture was 
supported with millions of dollars by both organized and private donations.179 Its 
drafters were a veritable “who’s-who” of election law experts and distinguished 
academics. 
Still, creating an independent commission to draw district boundaries is no small 
task. Part of the difficulty is that there is no single model to follow. Seventeen states 
now use commissions to allocate electoral districts, and they differ widely. 
Redistricting commissions range from large to small: California employs a fourteen-
member commission,180 while Arkansas sits only three.181 Partisanship requirements 
vary widely, with some states requiring an even split between Republicans and 
Democrats,182 some states allowing the majority and minority party leaders to 
nominate an equal number of commissioners (essentially accomplishing the same 
                                                                                                                                         
http://www.iandrinstitute.org/New%20IRI%20Website%20Info/I&R%20Research%20and%2
0History/I&R%20at%20the%20Statewide%20Level/Usage%20history/Arizona.pdf. 
 175 ZIMMERMAN, supra note 131, at 15. 
 176 For instance, a super majority of the legislature can pass amendments. OHIO CONST. art. 
XVI, §1. Or the voters can elect, via petition or periodically every other decade, to call a 
constitutional convention. Id. §§ 2–3. 
 177 OHIO CONST. art. II, § 1a. 
 178 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. 
 179 Campaign expenditures in support totaled $4,082,557.00. Campaign Expenditures, 
OHIO SEC’Y OF STATE, available at 
http://www2.sos.state.oh.us/pls/cfonline/f?p=119:47:114263680974926::NO::P47_ENTITY_I
D:13247. 
 180 CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(c)(2). 
 181 ARK. CONST. art. VIII, § 1. 
 182 See, e.g., MO. CONST. art. III, §§ 2, 7. 
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purpose),183 and some states having no bipartisan requirements at all.184 While many 
states prohibit elected officials from serving as commissioners,185 a few states go 
even further, imposing strict limits on running for public office after serving on the 
commission.186 Some western states include residency restrictions.187  
But relatively few states use independent commissions to draw Congressional 
boundary lines.188 Of the seven states that do, most are appointed directly by partisan 
officeholders.189 Only California and Arizona break course.  
Next, I examine the two citizen commissions enacted by voters: those in Arizona 
and California. 
1. The Arizona Model 
Arizona seats a five-member redistricting commission.190 To choose 
commissioners, the state appellate court creates a pool of twenty-five applicants.191 
This pool consists of ten applicants from each of the two largest parties and five not 
from either of the two largest parties.192 The highest-ranking majority and minority 
members of the house and senate each select a member from the pool.193 The four 
selected applicants then select, from the remaining pool, a fifth applicant to serve as 
chair. This fifth member must be non-affiliated with either political party 
represented.194 In the event the four-member commission is deadlocked in picking a 
                                                                                                                                         
 183 See, e.g., IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 184 See, e.g., ARK. CONST. art. VIII. 
 185 See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. VI, §8(a). 
 186 Hawaii prohibits commissioners from running for public office for the following two 
election cycles. HAW. CONST. art. IV, §2. By contrast, all three commissions in Arkansas are 
elected officials. ARK. CONST. art. VIII. 
 187 See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. V, § 48(1)(c) (“No more than four commission members 
shall be residents of the same congressional district, and each congressional district shall have 
at least one resident as a commission member. At least one commission member shall reside 
west of the continental divide.”). 
 188 These states are Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, New Jersey, and 
Washington. ARIZ. CONST. art. 4, pt. 2, § 1(3); CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(d); HAW. CONST. art. 
IV, § 2; MONT. CONST. art. V, § 14(2); N.J. CONST. art. II, § 2 para 1(a); WASH. CONST. art. II, 
§ 43(1). Indiana uses a “fall back” commission in cases there the legislature fails to certify a 
map. IND. CODE § 3-3-2-2(a). It is not clear why only a minority of states have extended the 
power to draw congressional districts to redistricting commissions. One possible answer is the 
shadow of uncertainty surrounding congressional districts and the potential unconstitutional 
delegation of power. 
 189 Supra note 188.  
 190 ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1. 
 191 Id. 
 192 Id. 
 193 Id. 
 194 Id. 
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chair, the Commission on Appellate Court Appointments appoints the chair.195 
Arizona requires a simple majority vote of the citizens commission to pass a map. 
After certification, commissioners are prohibited from running for public office or 
registering as lobbyists for three years.196 Commissioners are removable by the 
governor, with the concurrence of two-thirds of the senate, for “substantial neglect of 
duty, gross misconduct in office, or inability to discharge the duties of office.”197 
The Arizona Constitution requires the commission to consider proportional 
population, compactness, contiguity, communities of interest, political subdivisions, 
and geographic boundaries.198 Although the Arizona Constitution calls for 
competitive districts, commissioners are not to use party registration or voting trend 
data in the initial stages, relegating compactness to a tertiary requirement.199  
2. The California Model 
California seats a fourteen-member redistricting commission.200 The state 
constitution requires that five commissioners are members of the majority party, five 
are from the minority party, and the remaining four are non-affiliated.201 To approve 
an electoral map requires nine votes, including three Democratic commissioners, 
three Republican commissioners, and three non-affiliated commissioners.202 
To appoint members to the commission, the State Auditor establishes an 
Applicant Review Panel.203 This Applicant Review Panel evaluates all of the 
conforming commissioner applications and selects sixty of the most qualified 
applicants,204 including twenty who are registered with the largest political party in 
California based on registration, twenty who are registered with the second largest 
party, and twenty who are non-affiliated with either party.205 The house and senate 
majority and minority leaders then may strike two names each.206 Eight names are 
                                                                                                                                         
 195 Id. The current Chair is a registered independent. She was choosing unanimously by the 
bi-partisan board. Commissioners, ARIZONA INDEPENDENT REDISTRICTING COMMISSION, 
available at http://azredistricting.org/About-IRC/Commissioners.asp. 
 196 ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1. 
 197 Id. 
 198 Id. 
 199 Id. 
 200 Id. 
 201 CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(c)(2). To protect against wolves in sheep’s clothing, the 
applicants must have been registered with that party for at least five years, and had voted in 
the previous two election cycles. Id. Any person donating more than $2,000 to a candidate in 
the preceding 10 years is also barred. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8252(a)(2)(vi) (West 2008). 
 202 CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(c)(5). 
 203 The Audit Review Panel is selected by lot and is itself bipartisan. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 
8252(b) (West 2008). 
 204 Based on “relevant analytical skills, ability to be impartial, and appreciation for 
California’s diverse demographics and geography.” CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8252(d) (West 2008). 
 205 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8252(d) (West 2008). 
 206 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8252(e) (West 2008). 
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then selected by lottery—three Republicans, three Democrats, and two non-
affiliated.207 These eight commissioners then select six more from the remaining pool 
of applicants—two Republicans, two Democrats, and two non-affiliated.208 
California imposes strict restrictions on commission members. Outgoing 
commissioners are prohibited from running for public office for ten years and from 
seeking various appointments and types of employment for five.209 Neither the 
constitution nor California statute provides terms for commissioner removal.  
California ranks the various criteria for drawing districts, from highest priority to 
lowest priority. Those criteria are, in order: equal population,210 compliance with the 
Voting Rights Act,211 geographical contiguity,212 maintenance of political 
subdivisions balanced against maintaining communities of interest,213 and “to the 
extent practicable, and where this does not conflict with the criteria above,” 
compactness.214 
3. The Issue 2 Model 
Issue 2 described a nomination process borrowed, in part, from both Arizona and 
California. Issue 2 called for a twelve-member commission.215 Ohio appellate judges 
would manage the commissioner selection process.216 Under Issue 2, any person 
interested in serving on the citizens commission could submit an application to the 
Secretary of State.217 To pare down the applicant pool, the Chief Justice of the Ohio 
Supreme Court would commission a panel of eight Ohio appellate judges.218 The 
                                                                                                                                         
 207 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8252(f) (West 2008). 
 208 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8252(g) (West 2008). 
 209 This includes “paid staff for, or as a paid consultant to, the Board of Equalization, the 
Congress, the Legislature, or any individual legislator, or to register as a federal, state or local 
lobbyist in this State.” CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(c)(6). 
 210 CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(d)(1). 
 211 CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(d)(2). 
 212 CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(d)(3). 
 213 Conceding that political and community divisions do not always share the boundaries, 
the constitution provides examples of balancing certain communities of interest over political 
subdivisions. CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(d)(4) (“Examples of such shared interests are those 
common to an urban area, a rural area, an industrial area, or an agricultural area, and those 
common to areas in which the people share similar living standards, use the same 
transportation facilities, have similar work opportunities, or have access to the same media of 
communication relevant to the election process.”). 
 214 CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(d)(5). The constitutional also asked commissioners, if 
possible, to form state senate districts by combining two whole legislative districts. CAL. 
CONST. art. XXI, § 2(d)(6). 
 215 ISSUE 2 FULL TEXT, supra note 62, at 1. 
 216 Id. at 2. 
 217 Issue 2 was silent on criteria for eligibility. “The Secretary of State shall make available 
an appropriate application form designed to help determine the eligibility and qualifications of 
applicants and shall publicize the application process.” Id. 
 218 Id. 
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Chief Justice would assign these judges by lot, ensuring no more than four judges 
were members of a single political party.219 This appellate panel would then fashion 
selection standards to narrow the pool of applicants to 42 citizens with “the relevant 
skills and abilities, including a capacity for impartiality, and who reflect the diversity 
of Ohio.”220 These 42 candidates would reflect the 16 highest-qualified Republican, 
Democrat, and non-affiliated applicants, voted on by the appellate judges.221 The 
Ohio Speaker of the House and minority leader would give permission to eliminate 
up to three candidates. Of the remaining pool, nine citizens would then be chosen by 
lot—three nominees from the majority party, three nominees from the minority 
party, and three nominees unaffiliated with either party.222 The nine citizen-nominees 
would then select three more candidates from the pool—one Republican, one 
Democrat, and one non-affiliated—bringing the citizens commission to a total of 
twelve.223 Issue 2 did not provide terms for commissioner removal, but went further, 
providing “[n]o member of the Commission shall be subject to removal by the 
general assembly or any member of the executive branch.”224 Issue 2 prescribed 
heavy restrictions on commissioner applicants.225 After serving on the commission, 
commissioners were time-barred from running for public office in any district they 
created.  
Issue 2’s redistricting criteria are similar to Arizona’s. Unlike California, the 
criteria are not weighted to any one factor. Issue 2 listed as criteria: contiguity, 
maintenance of community preservation and political subdivision, competiveness, 
representational fairness, and compactness.226 
4. An Unconstitutional Proposition? 
At the time of publication, the future of the referendum-enacted citizens 
commissions—at least as far as their power to draw Congressional districts—is in 
question. On October 2, 2014, the United States Supreme Court accepted a writ of 
certiorari in the case of Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent 
Redistricting Commission, et al.227 The Court will decide if the Elections Clause of 
the United States Constitution and 2 U.S.C. § 2a(c) permit the use of a citizens 
commission to adopt Congressional districts.228 
                                                                                                                                         
 219 Id. 
 220 Id. 
 221 Id. 
 222 Id. 
 223 Id. 
 224 Id. 
 225 Within ten years of the date of application, applicants were barred from holding elected 
office or certain political employment, including lobbying. Within five years of the date of 
application, applicants were barred from running for officer, holding certain jobs, or 
contributing over $5,000 to campaign over a two year period. ISSUE 2 FULL TEXT, supra note 
62. 
 226 Id. 
 227 Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 46 (2014). 
 228 Id. 
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The Constitution explicitly grants state legislatures the power to draw district 
lines.229 Specifically, the Elections Clause provides that “[t]he Times, Places and 
Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in 
each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law 
make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.”230 
Meanwhile, 2 U.S.C. §2a prescribes the mechanics of how Congressional 
reapportionment is delegated to the states, providing “[u]ntil a State is redistricted in 
the manner provided by the law thereof after any apportionment, the Representatives 
to which such State is entitled under such apportionment shall be elected in the 
following manner . . . .”231  
The appeal follows a decision in the Arizona District Court finding in favor of 
the citizens commission.232 As of the time of publication, thirteen parties had filed 
amicus briefs in support of the Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission. The 
variety of interested parties highlights the cross-party appeal of popular referendum 
as a matter of states’ rights and, perhaps, general support for creative, locally-crafted 
redistricting reform. Amici in support of the commission include a range of 
contrasting political agendas—for instance, the League of Women Voters and the 
California Chamber of Commerce both filed in support of upholding the 
commission.233  
                                                                                                                                         
 229 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. 
 230 Id. 
 231 2 U.S.C. §2a(c) (2012) (emphasis added). The forerunner to 2 U.S.C. §2a, the 1911 
congressional-apportionment act, eliminated a prior statutory reference to the state legislature 
redistricting, in favor of the broader language of “provided by the law.” Some amici have 
argued that the change was in direct response to the rise in referendum use at the turn of the 
century. See, e.g., Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellee Arizona 
Independent Redistricting Commission at 2-3, Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. 
Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 46 (2014) (No. 13-1314) 2015 WL 309078 (“In drafting the 
1911 congressional-apportionment act, Congress recognized an emerging development in 
several States to supplement the traditional legislature-based model of lawmaking with a 
direct lawmaking role for the people, through the processes of initiative . . . and referendum . . 
. .The text of the 1911 law accordingly eliminated the statutory reference to redistricting by 
the state “legislature” and instead directed that, if a State’s apportionment of Representatives 
increased, the State should use the statutory default procedures “until such State shall be 
redistricted in the manner provided by the laws thereof.”) (citing Act of Aug. 8, 1911, ch. 5, § 
4, 37 Stat. 14). 
 232 Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 997 F. Supp. 2d 1047, 
1056 (D. Ariz. 2014). 
 233 Brief of Former California Governors George Deukmejian, Pete Wilson, and Arnold 
Schwarzenegger; Charles T. Munger, Jr.; Bill Mundell; and California Chamber of Commerce 
as Amici Curiae as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellee Arizona Independent Redistricting 
Commission at 1, Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 46 
(2014); Brief of the Campaign Legal Center, The League of Women Voters of the United 
States, The American Civil Liberties Union, Common Cause, and Democracy 2 as Amici 
Curiae as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellee Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission 
at 1, Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 46 (2014). Other 
amici include the Brennan Center, the United States, various states, and the California 
Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission.   
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The merits of the case are well outside of the scope of this Note. The question is 
intrinsically interlaced with deep questions of constitutional textual interpretations, 
direct democracy, federalism, the evolution of election law, and, of course, 
legislative delegation. Perhaps for the purposes here, it is reassuring that the only 
two cases decided regarding legislative delegation under the Election Clause upheld 
the laws in question.234 
Until now, very little scholarship was devoted to whether an independent 
commission is an impermissible delegation of power.235 Even during Issue 2’s 2012 
campaign, the constitutional argument was mentioned only sporadically in Ohio.236 
Still, the question has persisted. The outcome of Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona 
Independent Redistricting Commission likely will decide the scope of powers that 
voters can delegate by referendum. If struck down, citizen commissions will be 
limited to drawing state legislative boundaries—no small concession.237 Whatever 
the outcome, the decision should lay to rest the cloud of unconstitutionality 
surrounding Congressional redistricting by citizens commissions. Win or lose, the 
decision will affirm the validity of a voter-enacted commission. This effectively 
removes an arrow in the quiver of the opposition—namely, claims that the 
commission is an illegal derogation of legislative power. 
                                                                                                                                         
 234 In Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565, 570 (1916) the Court upheld an 
amendment to the Ohio state constitution reserving a referendum veto the legislative power to 
approve or disapprove by popular vote any law passed by the state legislature. The Court 
found the challenge—under both the Elections Clause and Guarantee Clause—“plainly 
without substance.” Id. at 569. In Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 375 (1932) the Court upheld 
the Minnesota governor’s ability to veto a redistricting plan approved by the state legislature. 
The Court held the delegation was consistent with the Elections Clause, finding “no 
suggestion in [the Elections Clause] of an attempt to endow the Legislature of the state with 
power to enact laws in any manner other than that in which the Constitution of the state has 
provided that laws shall be enacted.” Id. at 368. 
 235 Compare C. Bryan Wilson, What's A Federalist to Do? The Impending Clash Between 
Textualism and Federalism in State Congressional Redistricting Suits Under Article I, Section 
4, 53 DUKE L.J. 1367, 1384–92 (2004) (arguing a Federalist construction of article 1 section 4 
provides latitude in delegating redistricting powers), with Michael T. Morley, The Intratextual 
Independent “Legislature” & the Elections Clause, 109 NW. U.L. REV. ONLINE 131, 134 
(2015) (arguing that an intratextual reading of the Elections Clause requires “that the term 
legislature should be interpreted in accordance with its plain meaning, as referring solely and 
exclusively to the multimember body of representatives within each state generally 
responsible for enacting its laws.”). 
 236 See, e.g., Mark R. Brown, Proposed Independent Redistricting Commission is 
Unconstitutional, PLAIN DEALER (Aug. 25, 2012), 
http://www.cleveland.com/opinion/index.ssf/2012/08/proposed_commission_is_unconst.html 
(arguing delegation of redistricting powers is contrary to drafters’ intent). Cf. Martin H. 
Belsky, The Proposed Ohio Redistricting Commission—The People’s Decision, PLAIN 
DEALER (Sept. 13, 2012), 
http://www.cleveland.com/opinion/index.ssf/2012/09/the_proposed_ohio_redistrictin.html 
(arguing, among other things, that “manner” could indicate only technical details of the actual 
balloting process, and not specifically vesting the actual drawing of lines). 
 237 This is an important distinction. Even if the Court rules citizens commissions a violation 
of the Elections Clause or 2 U.S.C. §2a, a future Ohio citizens commission could draw the 
boundaries for the 33 senate and 99 house of representative districts in the General Assembly. 
OHIO CONST. art. XI, § 2. 
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III. STRATEGIC DECISIONS: HOW TO USE THE COURTS IN OHIO REDISTRICTING PLANS 
“We cannot enter into alliances until we are acquainted with the designs 
of our neighbors . . . 
We shall be unable to turn natural advantage to account unless we make 
use of local guides.” 
   - Sun Tzu238 
 
“We believed that judges were being drawn into a political process that was not 
appropriate. We wanted judges to continue to be seen as the objective, independent 
arbiters of disputes.”239 As President of the Ohio State Bar Association (“OSBA”), 
Jonathan Hollingsworth found himself in uncharted waters. Comprised of more than 
26,000 Ohio lawyers and judges, the OSBA rarely ripples Ohio’s political pool.240 
But Issue 2 directly tasked Ohio judges with managing the appointment process for a 
new citizen redistricting commission.241 The OSBA answered with an 
uncharacteristically strident response. By the close of 2012, the organization spent 
$241,000 in opposition.242  
Issue 2 employed state judges in two ways. First, Ohio appellate judges managed 
the citizens commission selection process. The Chief Justice of the Ohio Supreme 
Court was to commission a bipartisan panel of eight Ohio appellate judges to narrow 
down the pool of commissioner applicants to 42 citizens with “the relevant skills and 
abilities, including a capacity for impartiality, and who reflect the diversity of 
Ohio.”243  
Second, Issue 2 employed the court as a referee. The referendum required the 
Ohio Supreme Court to guarantee that an electoral map would be in place before the 
general election.244 If the commission failed to agree on a map, the court would 
choose from the plans submitted or considered by the board and choose the one that 
                                                                                                                                         
 238 SUN TZU, THE ART OF WAR, VII §§ 12, 14 (Lionel Giles trans.) available at 
http://classics.mit.edu//Tzu/artwar.html. 
 239 An interview with new OSBA President Jonathan Hollingsworth, OHIO STATE BAR 
ASS’N, https://www.ohiobar.org/NewsAndPublications/OhioLawyer/Pages/An-interview-
with-new-OSBA-President-Jonathan-Hollingsworth.aspx (last visited Mar. 31, 2015). 
 240 Joe Guillen, Redistricting proposal undermines a constitutional principle, Ohio State 
Bar Association Says, PLAIN DEALER (Aug. 08, 2012, 2:34 PM), 
http://www.cleveland.com/open/index.ssf/2012/08/redistricting_proposal_undermi.html. 
 241 Id. 
 242 MISC. FILINGS SCHEDULE CODE 30-B-2, OHIO SEC’Y OF STATE, available at 
http://www2.sos.state.oh.us/pls/cfonline/f?p=119:111:0::NO::P111_SEQ:130785541. 
 243 ISSUE 2 FULL TEXT, supra note 62. 
 244 In the event the Commission is not able to determine a plan by October 1, the Ohio 
Supreme Court would need to adopt a plan from all the plans submitted to the Commission. 
Id. 
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best fits the characteristics of community preservation, politically balanced districts, 
representational fairness, and compactness.245  
Of the two roles, the latter best suited the court’s organic adjudicatory role, while 
the former annoyed some Ohio judges.246 Given the controversy the issue raised, and 
the degree to which it distracted attention from the real need for reform, state judges 
would be better left out of the selection process. The redistricting process should 
only use courts to validate the results, not to manufacture the product.  
A. Never Expose the Judiciary to the Front Lines 
“It’s just really not a function that I see in my oath,” said Ohio Court of Appeals 
Fifth District Judge Sheila Farmer.247 Judge Farmer was speaking in her capacity as 
Chief Justice of the Ohio Court of Appeals Judges Association, which, on the heels 
of the Ohio Bar Association, followed suit in opposing the citizens commission.248  
Issue 2 prescribed a complex selection process; a process both initiated and 
managed by state judges. But in early 2012, it is unlikely any of the referendum 
authors considered this a weakness. On the contrary, Issue 2 proponents thought it 
wise to rely on judicial impartiality in selecting citizen commissioners.249 The 
OSBA’s announcement flipped the table on Voters First. Attempting to sidestep the 
influence of partisan politics, Issue 2 trod on judicial robes.250  
Both the OSBA and the Judges Association framed their opposition in terms of 
protecting judicial propriety. The OSBA explained their concerns in a press release, 
saying “[t]he proposed amendment inappropriately involves the judiciary by blurring 
the clearly-delineated lines separating the branches of government and makes judges 
and courts more vulnerable to political influence.”251  
Voters First balked—Issue 2 only asked judges to select viable candidates from a 
pool, a function hardly as intrusive as practiced in other citizen-commission states.252 
Said Tokaji, “[t]he bar association clearly didn’t do its homework. If I was the teacher, 
they would get a failing grade. I would expect better from a first-year law student.”253 In 
                                                                                                                                         
 245 Issue 2 is unclear where a “submitted” map might come from. The language suggests 
the court would pick between a limited number of completing maps. But what if none of the 
maps are in conformance? Issue 2 limits judge-made maps for one election cycle, with the 
commission to reconvene to try again. Id. 
 246 Guillen, supra note 7. 
 247 Id. 
 248 Id. 
 249 Jim Siegel, Judges Oppose Issue 2, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Sept. 21, 2012, 4:16 PM), 
http://www.dispatch.com/content/blogs/the-daily-briefing/2012/09/9-21-12-judicial-issue-
2.html. 
 250 Id. 
 251 OSBA Calls for Appropriate Ballot Language for Issue 2, OHIO STATE BAR ASS’N, 
https://www.ohiobar.org/NewsAndPublications/News/OSBANews/Pages/OSBA-calls-for-
appropriate-ballot-language-for-Issue-2.aspx (last visited Jan. 31, 2014). 
 252 Arizona selects its candidates via judicial nomination. ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1. 
 253 Jeff Bell, Issue 2 Opposition Splits Ohio State Bar Association Membership, COLUMBUS 
BUSINESS FIRST (Sept. 7, 2012, 6:00 AM), http://www.bizjournals.com/columbus/print-
edition/2012/09/07/opposition-by-state-bar-garners.html?page=all. 
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September of 2012, twelve members of the OSBA issued a public letter in defense of 
Issue 2.254 This letter was meant to assuage the public of Issue 2’s sound legal footing. 
Instead, it served to highlight the rift inside the state’s legal community.  
It is impossible to determine to what extent the OSBA opposition was politically 
motivated. OSBA spokesman Ken Brown said it is “simply preposterous” to assume 
the OSBA was exercising a political agenda.255 “The OSBA has always maintained 
excellent relationships with legislators on both sides of the aisle . . . . Our position is 
a defense of a fair and impartial judiciary is clear–nothing more, nothing less.”256 In 
the endgame, it hardly mattered if the legal community’s disagreements on Issue 2 
were doctrinal or political. The damage was done. The opposition highlighted the 
disagreement, hoping to cast doubt over the viability of Issue 2.257 
Voters First did not propose a radical innovation: including state judges in the 
citizens commission selection process was, from the point of precedent, hardly 
provocative. First, the practice has the weight of precedent. A number of states use 
their judiciaries to not only establish an applicant pool, but in Alaska, Arizona, and 
Colorado, state judges actually select the commissions.258 Second, without expressly 
ruling on the issue per se, the U.S. Supreme Court has offered its tacit approval of 
state legislatures abdicating, either partially or fully, their redistricting powers.259 
Third and finally, this is the type of role judges assume all the time. Ohio judges are 
called to appoint Park Commissioners,260 Metropolitan Housing Authority Board 
members,261 and School District members.262 
But being right and winning are two different animals. Even though a judge-led 
nomination process is legal, it is not desirable as policy—at least not in Ohio. I offer 
two critiques of Issue 2’s nomination process. First, Issue 2 drafters should have 
                                                                                                                                         
 254 The open letter was signed by a dozen prominent law professors and attorneys throughout 
Ohio. The signees included Mary Beth Beazley, Subodh Chandra, Martha Chamallas, Ruth 
Colker, Joshua Dressler, Melvyn Durchslag, Arthur F. Greenbaum, Deborah Jones Merritt, 
Richard Saphire, Peter Shane, Lloyd Snyder, and Gary Leppla, a past president of the Ohio State 
Bar Association. Mary Beth Beazley et al., Voters First, Open Letter to Ohio, available at 
http://www.lwvohio.org/assets/attachments/file/Open%20Letter%20to%20Bar%20Associations%
20re%20Issue%202.pdf [hereinafter Voters First Open Letter]. 
 255 Bell, supra note 253. 
 256 Id. 
 257 Among the official arguments against was “[l]egal experts believe the amendment 
ignores the separation of government powers, inappropriately moving legislative appointment 
authority to the judiciary.” ARGUMENTS AGAINST, supra note 5.   
 258 ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 8; ARIZ. CONST. art. 4, pt. 2, § 1; COLO. CONST. art. V, § 48. 
New Jersey uses judges to break gridlock in selecting commissioners. N.J. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
 259 Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 751 (1973) (“We have repeatedly recognized that 
state reapportionment is the task of local legislatures or of those organs of state government 
selected to perform it.”) (emphasis added). 
 260 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1545.06 (West 2015). 
 261 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3735.27 (West 2015). 
 262 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.11 (West 2015). These were examples given by Voters 
First in a public letter to Ohio, defending judges’ role in the nomination process. Voters First 
Open Letter, supra note 254. 
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vetted the nomination process with the broader legal community, including the 
OSBA. That Issue 2 appeared to blindside state judges provided ammunition to 
opponents, who labeled the referendum an “amateur production.”263 Second, the use 
of appellate judges provided only nominal benefit, namely the appearance of 
impartiality. Strict judicial impartiality would, at best, be speculative in Ohio, as 
Ohio judges are themselves elected members of a political party.264  
State judges were vocal in their preference to stay above the fray. Even if Voters 
First had vetted Issue 2 through the OSBA,265 there is no suggestion that judges 
would have happily endorsed their new role. The defense for this attack is relatively 
simple: future redistricting efforts should not include the judiciary in the 
appointment process. As discussed below, the judiciary is properly employed 
reviewing redistricting plans.266 
There are practical reasons to insulate judges from the map-making process. 
Curiously absent from the back-and-forth was any debate on the suitability of judges 
to shape the commission.267 Ohio judges are perhaps not as immune to political 
pressure as claimed.268 Ohio votes for its judges.269 As elected officials, their tenure 
is subject to the whim of the electorate. Critics have roundly criticized Ohio’s 
judicial selection process as among the worst in the nation.270 Campaign 
                                                                                                                                         
 263 Declining to endorse Issue 2 in mid-October, the Columbus Dispatch cited judicial 
disapproval. No on State Issue 2, Redistricting Proposal Complicated, Clumsy and Full of 
Conflicts, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Oct. 14, 2012, 6:34 AM), 
http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/editorials/2012/10/14/no-on-state-issue-2.html. 
 264 It is unclear what standard of review courts (presumably the Ohio Supreme Court) 
would use to weigh a challenge to the impartiality of appellate judges during the selection 
process. 
 265 A reoccurring theme throughout the campaign was the lack of communication between 
state judges and Voters First during the drafting process. It is not clear if the OSBA, Appeals 
Judges Association, or any other organization was formally consulted.  
 266 The OSBA itself said this. “The proper role for the judiciary is not to develop any 
redistricting plan, but rather to review such plans should they be challenged in court.” 
Statement on Ohio Redistricting Amendment, supra note 6. 
 267 Issue 2 opponents were silent on charges of potential judicial partisanship or suitability, 
perhaps to avoid alienating the OSBA and Ohio Court of Appeals Judges Association. 
However, the OSBA itself has called for judicial selection reform. David M. Benson, OSBA 
Calls for Reform of Judicial Selection, OHIO LAW. WKLY., Dec. 18, 2000, at 1. 
 268 Voters First defense of using elected judges states: 
[w]e can think of no one better suited to evaluate the capacity for impartiality of 
potential commission members than judges. In fact, this is precisely why appellate 
judges were chosen to serve this role. Any suggestion that appellate judges are 
incapable of evaluating the capacity for impartiality, without having their own 
impartiality tainted, simply underestimates the fine men and women who serve in this 
capacity. 
Voters First Open Letter, supra note 254. 
 269 OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 6.  
 270 “[A]lthough there may be no good method of selecting and retaining judges, there is a 
worst method, and Ohio is among the states to have found it . . . judges qualify for their jobs 
by raising very large sums of money from lawyers, litigants, and special interest groups, and 
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expenditures for judicial seats in Ohio are among the highest in the nation.271 In 
2004, Ohio Supreme Court supporters spent over seven million dollars bombarding 
Ohio television sets.272 Between 2000 and 2009, Ohio spent more than any other 
state on television advertisements for judicial candidates,273 and, at twenty-one 
million dollars, ranked second only to Alabama in total judicial campaign 
expenditures.274 As Ohio Supreme Court Justice Paul Pfeifer famously told the New 
York Times in 2006, “I never felt so much like a hooker down by the bus station . . . 
as I did in a judicial race. Everyone interested in contributing has very specific 
interests. They mean to be buying a vote.”275 
The bottom line is that Ohio judges want to be left out of redistricting.276 It 
doesn’t matter that judges hire or appoint government officials every day. And it 
doesn’t matter whether or not society trusts them as impartial arbiters in other areas 
of partisan dispute, such as election law, voting rights, and campaign finance. It is 
enough to say that having judges and attorneys speak against Issue 2 cost the 
movement momentum and credibility. It is better to avoid questions of integrity and 
give the OSBA and Ohio judges what they want.277 
B. Only Include the High Court in the Adjudicatory Process  
What if the citizens commission failed to certify an electoral map? Issue 2 
required the Ohio Supreme Court take over ensuring districts were set prior to the 
general election.278 This provision was an unmistakable reaction to the abortive 
                                                                                                                                         
retain their offices only by continuing to raise such funds.” Paul D. Carrington & Adam R. 
Long, The Independence and Democratic Accountability of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 30 
CAP. U. L. REV. 455, 471-72 (2002). 
 271 JAMES SAMPLE, ADAM SKAGGS, JONATHAN BLITZER & LINDA CASEY, THE NEW POLITICS 
OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2000–2009 12, 26 (Charles Hall ed., Brennan Center for Justice 2010), 
available at http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/JAS-NPJE-Decade-
ONLINE.pdf [hereinafter SAMPLE, JUDICIAL ELECTIONS]. 
 272 Id. In comparison, the 2004 US Senate race in Ohio raised $11.8 million. Id.  
 273 SAMPLE, JUDICIAL ELECTIONS, supra note 271, at 27. 
 274 Id. at 12. 
 275 Adam Liptak & Janet Roberts, Campaign Cash Mirrors a High Court's Rulings, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 1, 2006), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/01/us/01judges.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
 276 Following Issue 2’s defeat, OSBA spokesman Ken Brown reiterated that “[the OSBA’s] 
problem is judges don’t belong in the middle of a political process such as redistricting—
that’s a legislative function, not a judicial function . . . the court should only be involved in 
interpreting the law later if there’s a question or controversy raised.” Kate Irby, Ohio State 
Bar Association Urges Commission to take up Redistricting Reform, PLAIN DEALER (Nov. 14, 
2012, 6:06 AM), 
http://www.cleveland.com/open/index.ssf/2012/11/ohio_state_bar_association_urg.html. 
 277 There is no evidence on the polling effects from the OSBA or Judges Association’s 
announcements against Issue 2. It is likely Issue 2 would have lost even with their support. 
However, the media cited their objections frequently in the months leading up to the election.  
 278 “In the event the Commission is not able to determine a plan by October 1, the Ohio 
Supreme Court would need to adopt a plan from all the plans submitted to the Commission.” 
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launch of Arizona’s citizens commission. More than a decade before Ohio voters 
considered Issue 2, Arizona voters passed Proposition 106, establishing a citizen 
redistricting commission.279 But in Arizona, the proposed electoral map does not 
require legislative or judicial approval.280 Rather, after a thirty-day public comment 
period, the plan is submitted to the Secretary of State for certification.281 
The lack of automatic judicial review cost Arizona years of embarrassing 
bickering. After the Arizona citizens commission certified its first electoral map in 
late 2001, a citizens’ coalition filed suit in state court, claiming the electoral map 
failed to create competitive districts as required by the Arizona Constitution.282 
Native American tribes also filed suit, claiming violations of the Voting Rights Act. 
The citizens commission lost.283 Arizona politicians found themselves stuck between 
the Scylla and Charybdis of redistricting: both the old map and the proposed map 
were unconstitutional. Four years of litigious in-fighting followed. For two election 
cycles, courts stepped in to provide temporary or retroactive electoral maps.284 
Presumably to avoid a similar fiasco, Issue 2 required the Ohio Supreme Court to 
guarantee that an electoral map is certified well in advance of the subsequent 
election.285 
But Issue 2 did not grant the Ohio Supreme Court a new power or responsibility. 
Rather, it set a statutory deadline for the court to take charge of the redistricting 
process. Courts are no strangers to taking the reins when legislatures (or 
commissions) certify flawed maps. Many courts handle the unenviable task of 
drawing temporary maps themselves. In 2010, eight state courts were forced to draw 
their states’ electoral maps when the appointed bodies defaulted.286 Issue 2 
proponents recognized that “[w]hile there has been some criticism of the fact that the 
Supreme Court has the authority to draw maps if the commission cannot reach 
agreement, it has always been the case—in Ohio and other states—that the state 
courts draw plans as a last resort . . . [n]othing has changed in this respect.”287 
                                                                                                                                         
ISSUE 2 FULL TEXT, supra note 62. Issue 2 is silent on where these submitted plans would 
come from, or the process to submit.  
 279 State of Arizona Official Canvas, ARIZ. SEC’Y OF STATE (Nov. 27, 2000, 11:13 AM), 
available at http://apps.azsos.gov/election/2000/General/Canvass2000GE.pdf. 
 280 Id. 
 281 Id. § 1(16)–(17). 
 282 Navajo Nation v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 230 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1002 (D. 
Ariz. 2002). 
 283 Ariz. Minority Coal. for Fair Redist. v. Ariz. Indep. Redist. Comm’n, 121 P.3d 843, 
849, 851 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005) (per curiam). 
 284 In 2002, both the proposed map and the previous map were deemed unconstitutional. 
The courts allowed the Secretary of State to use the 2000 map to ensure continuity. Id. at 849. 
In 2004, the citizens commission map was certified too late to allow the Secretary of State 
print new ballots, so the 2002 map was used. Id.  
 285 ISSUE 2 FULL TEXT, supra note 62. 
 286 Loyola Law Sch., Litigation over Congressional Lines—2010 Cycle, ALL ABOUT 
REDISTRICTING, http://redistricting.lls.edu/who-courtfed10.php (last visited Jan. 31, 2014). 
 287 Voters First Open Letter, supra note 254. 
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The U.S. Supreme Court recognizes the duty of courts to act when legislatures 
fail.288 In Reynolds v. Sims, the Court held that “judicial relief becomes appropriate 
only when a legislature fails to reapportion according to federal constitutional 
requisites in a timely fashion after having had an adequate opportunity to do so.”289 
In Branch v. Smith, a plurality of the Court ruled that it was proper for the district 
court to devise a redistricting plan when the Mississippi legislature was unable to do 
so.290 Most states agree with the plurality in Branch, allowing courts varying degrees 
of involvement in redistricting.291 Courts nearly drew Ohio’s district lines in 2010 
when legislators threatened to delay the approval of the 2010 district map.292 
But the ability of a court to draw a map does not necessarily solve the Arizona 
problem, which was caused by post-hoc review after post-hoc review. The October 
1st deadline arguably improved the reliability of the citizens commission by 
establishing a target date for a map. Issue 2 might have gone one step further, 
mandating the Ohio Supreme Court automatically to certify the map. 
Colorado requires its redistricting commission to automatically submit its 
proposed map to the state supreme court.293 This makes sense. Practically all 
electoral maps are challenged.294 Every redistricting effort produces winners and 
losers; the vagaries of redistricting law (how one defines “compactness” or 
“community integrity,” for instance, or how to balance the competing factors) allow 
the losers to seek remedy. A mandatory, timely review by the state’s highest court 
will provide legitimacy and confidence. It will also expedite the correction of a 
rejected map, giving both the court and the commission adequate time to review and 
remedy any flaws. 
C. Shifting the Role of the Judiciary Heals Perceived Flaws in Issue 2 
I propose that the Ohio legislature prescribe the minimum criteria for 
membership of the citizens commission. Nearly every state that utilizes an 
independent commission calls for the legislature, or members of the legislature, to 
                                                                                                                                         
 288 But the Court has cautioned that judicial relief is most appropriately exercised at the 
state level. See Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 34 (1993). 
 289 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 586 (1964). 
 290 “We think, therefore, that while [the Voting Rights Act] assuredly envisions legislative 
action, it also embraces action by state and federal courts when the prescribed legislative 
action has not been forthcoming.” Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 272 (2003). 
 291 On remand in Branch, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that the state court 
improperly drew Mississippi’s electoral map, as the “only state governmental entity 
authorized to draw new congressional districts is the Legislature.” Mauldin v. Branch, 866 So. 
2d 429, 431 (Miss. 2003). 
 292 Jim Siegel, State will have One Primary March 6, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Dec. 15, 2011, 
6:21 AM), http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2011/12/15/state-will-have-one-
primary-march-6.html. While there is no deadline for establishing congressional districts, state 
legislative districts must be established by October 1st. OHIO CONST. art. XI, § 1. 
 293 COLO. CONST. art. V, § 48(1)(e). 
 294 Voting and Democracy v. Trends in State Self-Regulation of the Redistricting Process, 
119 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1165 (2006). 
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select commissioners.295 Transferring this power from the judiciary to the legislature 
makes sense. First and foremost, the power to redistrict is already invested in the 
General Assembly.296 Here, the legislature retains at least some influence. Allowing 
the legislature to fashion general criteria also blunts the charges of unaccountability 
to voters.297  
I do not believe this is a fatal blow to the “independence” of the commission. 
First, the legislature’s only responsibility would be to establish applicant 
qualifications. The legislature will be allowed only to recommend general 
qualifications related to the competence of the applicant and the ability of the 
applicant to carry out the duties of the commission. These qualifications might 
include restrictions such as minimum age, or highest level of education, but should 
be limited to those attributes that are critical to carrying out the duties of the 
commission. 
The mechanics of applicant selection should be simplified as follows. The 
legislature will publish the minimum qualifications for applying to the commission, 
as well as the rules and process for application. Final membership will be determined 
by simple lottery, with the final commission membership consisting of four 
commissioners from the majority party, four from the minority, and four unaffiliated 
with either party.  
Next, upon passing an electoral map by a majority of commissioners, that map 
will be immediately certified by the Ohio Supreme Court. The Court will determine 
whether the commission produced an electoral map that corresponds to the drafting 
principles required by law. If the Court determines that the map fails to substantially 
satisfy any or all of these principles, the Court will remand it to the commission with 
instructions to remedy.  
These proposals share many similarities with Issue 2. The endgame is twelve 
commissioners in a bipartisan spread. But the trade-off is clear: instead of the 
judiciary managing the process, it is the legislature. In fact, the commission is more 
or less “born” from the legislature.298 But its influence is limited. The General 
Assembly can establish minimum criteria for applicants, and determine the rules for 
the application process and the lottery. Thus legislature retains checks and balances, 
but has no direct substantive influence on the final makeup of the commission. 
Judges are free from the task of managing the commission, and instead review their 
products, ensuring both timeliness and a presumption of validity. 
                                                                                                                                         
 295 Although it is foreseeable (and conceded) that the legislature can influence the applicant 
pool through minimum qualifications and the like, this power is certainly limited when 
compared to the power to directly appoint an individual.  
 296 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. 
 297 This was a continuing theme throughout the election. See, e.g., Protect Your Vote Ohio, 
The Ohio Citizens Independent Redistricting Commission: The Scheme to Silence the Power 
of Your Vote, THE OHIO LIBERTY COMM’N, available at 
http://www.ohiolibertycoalition.org/media/pdf/RedistrictingAmendmentHandout.pdf (“The 
commission would consist of 12 members selected by judges. Voters would have no say in 
who serves, robbing the people of their voice in the matter.”). 
 298 ARGUMENTS AGAINST, supra note 5.   
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 There is no question, and I do not mean to assert, that a simple lottery run 
by the legislature is in any way comparable to the mechanics of Issue 2. Issue 2 was, 
perhaps, the most thoughtful, integrated approach at procedural fairness and integrity 
yet put on paper. The drafters knew what they were doing. I propose a simple lottery 
as an alternative to the status quo, as a bipartisan citizens commission is certainly 
more attractive than a political commission. The potential for political 
gamesmanship in establishing the commission is clear and abundant. The single 
advantage with my proposal is simplicity: both in text and in concept. 
IV. TACTICAL DECISIONS: EMPLOYING SIMPLICITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
 “All warfare is based on deception.” 
    -Sun Tzu299 
A. Never Let the Opposition Frame Your Question 
“And so on the one hand we have these two proposals and, yes . . . they are very 
different,” said David Langon, speaking in front of the Ohio Ballot Board in August 
2012.300 Langdon was counsel for Protect Your Vote Ohio, a conservative interest 
group that proposed a GOP-friendly summary of Issue 2 to appear on Ohio ballots. 
“[W]hat you have going on is some cherry picking. We are picking things out of the 
proposed amendment that we like, and we're attempting to put it into the ballot 
language.”301 
Ballot language is among the most sensitive issues facing any referendum 
question. What a ballot question actually asks might determine its success.302 As 
such, it is left to the courts to umpire the integrity of the vote. The Ohio Supreme 
Court acknowledged this in Bailey v Celebrezze, explaining that the text of the ballot 
question is directly correlated to the integrity of the referendum process itself: it 
must fairly and accurately present the question in order to assure a free, intelligent, 
and informed vote by the citizenry.303  
In general, the longer a ballot question, the more confusing it becomes.304 
Oftentimes, these long ballot questions are born from equally long initiatives. This is 
because meandering legalese is difficult to distill into questions that voters can easily 
understand. Requiring state election officials to summarize a complex referendum 
invariably leads to a question only moderately representative of the full text, as 
                                                                                                                                         
 299 SUN TZU, THE ART OF WAR I § 18 (Lionel Giles trans.) available at 
http://classics.mit.edu//Tzu/artwar.html. 
 300 OHIO BALLOT BD., AUGUST BALLOT BOARD TRANSCRIPT 29 (2012), available at 
http://www.sos.state.oh.us/sos/upload/ballotboard/2012/2012-08-15-transcript.pdf [hereinafter 
AUGUST BALLOT BOARD TRANSCRIPT]. 
 301 Id. 
 302 See, e.g., POPULIST PARADOX, supra note 156, at 144 (long or confusing ballot measures 
too much for voters to comprehend); CRONIN, supra note 138, at 209 (“Voters who are 
confused and ‘burdened’ by ballot propositions either skip over them or vote against them.”). 
 303 State ex rel. Bailey v. Celebrezze, 426 N.E.2d 493, 519 (Ohio 1981); see also Markus v. 
Trumbull Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 259 N.E.2d 501, 501 (Ohio 1970). 
 304 See POPULIST PARADOX, supra note 156. 
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details are omitted or technical processes are marginalized.305 In Ohio, the drafters of 
the referendum are not responsible for drafting the summary language for voters. 
That duty falls into the hands of the secretary of state. The struggle to fall on neutral 
language is, of course, subject to judicial review. But the scope of this review is 
limited.  
This section discusses how a future citizens commission referendum can better 
position itself. It should use clear language, simple processes, and nothing 
unnecessary—especially text or provisions easily twisted and turned by the 
opposition. 
1. You Write the Law, Ohio Writes the Question 
“There are only two things that need to be said about Issue 2, it could've been 
much briefer . . . [and it] ensure[d] representational fairness, competitiveness, 
compactness and adherence to community boundaries,” said Tokaji in a press 
conference on the eve of the general election.306 “Almost everything else in there is 
just there to confuse the voters.”307 Early exit polls in Ohio were not encouraging. 
The 2012 final ballot was chock full of referendum questions, municipal levies, and 
a gubernatorial race.308 Issue 2 spanned two columns on some ballots.309 The final 
text was over a thousand words long.310 Ohio voters were confused by the complex 
constitutional question. 
“When people get confused, the gut instinct is to say ‘no’,” said Bentley Davis, 
state chair of the Alliance for Retired Americans.311 Davis had a stake in Issue 2—
the redistricting question preceded her organization’s referendum asking Columbus 
voters to approve funds for senior services. Davis was afraid the rangy Issue 2 would 
scare off voters, and cause them to skip over her own referendum.312 Voters First had 
similar fears: Ohio voters did not understand the question. For proponents, this was 
the calculated scheme of Republican Secretary of State John Husted. Voters First 
spent the majority of the summer of 2012 sparring with Secretary Husted’s Ballot 
                                                                                                                                         
 305 Recognizing this, some commentators have called for Secretaries of State to summarize 
ballot measures on one paragraph or less using word count limits. See, e.g., Larry J. Sabato et 
al., A Call for Change: Making the Best of Initiative Politics, in DANGEROUS DEMOCRACY? 
THE BATTLE OVER BALLOT INITIATIVES IN AMERICA 179, 189 (Larry Sabato, et al. eds., 2001). 
 306 Kate Irby, Ohio Issue 2 Supporters Say Long Ballot Summary is Confusing Voters, 
PLAIN DEALER (Nov. 1, 2012, 4:40 PM), 
http://www.cleveland.com/open/index.ssf/2012/11/ohio_issue_2_supporters_say_lo.html. 
 307 Id. 
 308 Id. 
 309 Id. 
 310 OHIO BALLOT BD., 2012 OHIO ISSUE 2 (2012), available at 
http://www.sos.state.oh.us/sos/upload/ballotboard/2012/2-language-a.pdf [hereinafter ISSUE 2 
BALLOT TEXT]. 
 311 Jackie Borchardt, Lengthy Issue 2 Wording Worries Supporters, DAYTON DAILY NEWS 
(Oct. 31, 2012, 7:00 PM), http://www.daytondailynews.com/news/news/state-regional-govt-
politics/lengthy-issue-2-wording-worries-supporters/nSsrR/. 
 312 This describes ballot “fall off,” or the tendency of voters to become fatigues with issues 
later on the ballot. See CRONIN, supra note 138, at 68–69. 
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Board over Issue 2, ending up before the state supreme court. Days before the 
election, Tokaji told reporters “I don’t think there’s any question that the goal of 
[Secretary] Husted’s Ballot Board, in approving this overly lengthy, cumbersome 
language, was to confuse people and by doing so get them to vote ‘no’ or not vote at 
all.”313  
The battle for Issue 2 began quietly on a Monday morning in early August. As 
the head of the Ohio Ballot Board, it was Secretary Husted who certified the 
proposed constitutional referendum submitted by Voters First, the newly named 
Issue 2, to appear on the November 6, 2012 ballot.314 Issue 2 now had a guaranteed 
seat at the ballot box, but what it would look like was still in the air. Secretary 
Husted announced that his Ohio Ballot Board would meet to decide how to describe 
Issue 2 to voters.  
That meeting was held on August 15, 2012.315 The hearing began with three 
competing ballot summaries. As a matter of course, Voters First introduced their 
proposed ballot text. But both the Ballot Board and Protect Your Vote Ohio, the 
latter of which was a recently organized committee in opposition to Issue 2, entered 
their own proposals.316 Perhaps finding their interests at least tangentially aligned, 
Protect Your Vote Ohio dropped their proposal in favor of the Ballot Board.317 
The hearing quickly turned polemic. Supported by a team of law professors and 
election law experts, Voters First argued vehemently against the Ballot Board’s 
proposed language. Among the points of contention, Voters First argued that the 
Ballot Board failed to explain to voters the purpose of the referendum (ultimately, 
this suggestion was loosely incorporated into the amended language).318 Among its 
particularized grievances, Voters First objected to the Ballot Board’s description of 
the citizens commission, finding the phrase “remove the authority of elected 
representatives” to be pejorative.319 Voters First claimed that the titles given the 
commissioners were equally prejudicial—the Ballot Board referred to the citizens 
                                                                                                                                         
 313 Id. Secretary Husted, a Republican, opposed Issue 2—he publically criticized the 
referendum prior to the general election. Reginald Fields, Ohio Secretary of State Jon Husted, 
Rising GOP Star, Frustrated by Court Challenges but Confident in State's Elections 
Operation, PLAIN DEALER (Sept. 14, 2012, 2:00 PM), 
http://www.cleveland.com/open/index.ssf/2012/09/ohio_secretary_of_state_jon_hu_3.html. 
 314 Letter of Certification of Issue 2 from Jon Husted, Sec’y of State, to Mike DeWine, 
Att’y Gen. (Apr. 5, 2012), available at http://www.sos.state.oh.us/upload/news/2012/2012-04-
05Redistricting.pdf. 
 315 AUGUST BALLOT BOARD TRANSCRIPT, supra note 300, at 1. 
 316 Id. at 20–29. 
 317 Protect Your Vote Ohio recognized the stark differences between the Voters First 
proposal and the Ballot Board proposal. Spokesperson David Langdon described the Ballot 
Board’s proposal as “very high level.” AUGUST BALLOT BOARD TRANSCRIPT, supra note 300, 
at 29. Tellingly, Langdon did ask “Why not all of it? And, again, we come back to this tension 
which is the more details that we add the more arbitrary it becomes . . . .” It may be assumed, 
as a matter of course, that opponents would be just as happy if Secretary Husted included the 
entire text of the referendum. Id. at 30. 
 318 Id. at 15–29. 
 319 Id. at 13. 
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commissioners as “appointed officials.”320 Discussed below, Voters First also 
objected to the weight and construction given to funding the commission. Pejorative 
or not, argued the board (reasoning that the terms could hardly induce prejudice, as 
they were unbiased descriptions), the summary of the proposed language was 
technically correct.  
In what would prove an ironic portent, Secretary Husted voiced his concern that 
Issue 2’s text was too long. He told Voters First he would prefer to put the whole 
question on the ballot, rather than to take steps to pare down the question into a 
summary.321 This option was certainly well within his power—the Ohio Constitution 
allows the Secretary of State to certify the question unadulterated to the voters.322 
But, according to Secretary Husted, that was not a real option.323 Instead, Husted 
asked his staff to draft “summary language that was brief and would do the best job 
possible of neutrally or generically describing the issue.”324 Over the protests of 
Issue 2 proponents, the Ballot Board voted 3-to-2 to certify the following language: 
Issue 2 
 
[TITLE HERE] 
 
Proposed Constitutional Amendment 
 
Proposed by Initiative Petition 
 
To add and repeal language in Sections 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9 and 13 of 
Article XI, repeal Sections 8 and 14 of Article XI, and add a new 
Section 16 to Article XI of the Constitution of the State of Ohio 
 
A majority yes vote is necessary for the amendment to pass. 
 
The proposed amendment would: 
 
1. Remove the authority of elected representatives and grant new 
authority to appointed officials to establish congressional and state 
legislative district lines. 
 
                                                                                                                                         
 320 Id. at 13–16. 
 321 AUGUST BALLOT BOARD TRANSCRIPT, supra note 300, at 66. 
 322 OHIO CONST. art. II, § 1(g). 
 323 Husted’s rather pragmatic concern that placing the entire text of Issue 2 “would have 
doubled the cost for someone to send a mail-in ballot back and it would have doubled the cost 
of sending the initial ballot out to the voter.” AUGUST BALLOT BOARD TRANSCRIPT, supra note 
300, at 66. 
 324 In truth, Husted might have saved a good deal of trouble certifying the entire text. Issue 
2 modified, amended, or repealed over a dozen articles of the Ohio constitution. ISSUE 2 FULL 
TEXT, supra note 62. If voters found the generalized ballot language confusing, it is logical to 
assume that the raw text would completely obscure the meaning and scope of Issue 2.  
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2. Create a state funded commission of appointed officials from a limited 
pool of applicants to replace the aforementioned. The Commission will 
consist of 12 members as follows: four affiliated with the largest political 
party, four affiliated with the second largest political party and four not 
affiliated with either of the two largest political parties. Affirmative votes 
of 7 of 12 members are needed to select a plan. 
 
3. Require new legislative and congressional districts be immediately 
established by the commission to replace the most recent districts adopted 
by elected representatives, which districts shall not be challenged except 
by court order until the next federal decennial census and apportionment. 
In the event the Commission is not able to determine a plan by October 1, 
the Ohio Supreme Court would need to adopt a plan from all the plans 
submitted to the Commission. 
 
4. Change the standards and requirements in the Constitution for drawing 
legislative and congressional districts. 
 
5. Mandate the General Assembly to appropriate all funds as determined 
by the Commission including, but not be limited to, compensating: 
 
1. Staff 
2. Consultants 
3. Legal counsel 
4. Commission members 
 
If approved, the amendment will be effective thirty days after the election. 
 
SHALL THE AMENDMENT BE APPROVED?325 
It was a clear conservative win. The board included nearly none of the language 
proposed by the proponents. Voters First filed suit, petitioning the Ohio Supreme 
Court for a writ of mandamus ordering the Secretary of State to redraft the 
question.326 
2. Issue 2 Goes to Court 
The Ohio Constitution provides that the Ballot Board will draft referendum 
questions in the same manner as they would summaries of constitutional 
amendments submitted to voters by joint resolutions of the General Assembly.327 But 
the Ohio Constitution provides a terse description of judicial standards, requiring 
reviewing courts to uphold the language unless it serves to “mislead, deceive, or 
defraud the voters.”328 
                                                                                                                                         
 325 State ex rel. Voters First v. Ohio Ballot Bd., 978 N.E.2d 119, 123–24 (Ohio 2012). 
 326 Id. The Ohio Supreme Court has original, exclusive jurisdiction over all referendum 
challenges. OHIO CONST. art. II, § 1(g). 
 327 OHIO CONST. art. II, § 1(g). 
 328 OHIO CONST. art. XVI, § 1. 
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Ohio has a straightforward jurisprudence when reviewing referendum 
language—one that focuses not on word choice but rather whether the voter 
objectively understands the question on the ballot. To evaluate the suitability of any 
given referendum question, Ohio uses a three-part test.329 First, voters have the right 
to know what it is upon which they are voting.330 Second, the referendum may not 
use language in a persuasive manner for or against the issue.331 Third and finally, the 
court will weigh whether the cumulative effects of technical defects in the language 
are “harmless or fatal to the validity of the ballot.”332 
A sage referendum draft will eliminate complex machinations. This is because 
technical, intricate, or simply long processes must, invariably, be described in 
enough detail on Ohio ballots to allow voters to understand on what they are voting. 
In State ex rel. Kilby v. Summit Cty. Bd. of Elections, the Ohio Supreme Court 
explained how a ballot issue must be summarized.333 Referendum language must 
“inform and protect the voter and presupposes a condensed text which is fair, honest, 
clear and complete, and from which no essential part of the proposed amendment is 
omitted.”334  
Secretary Husted certified ballot language describing Issue 2 that was far from 
“complete.” It made only superfluous mention of the of the nomination process, 
omitting any description of the legal mechanics of how commissioners were to be 
appointed. On this the court agreed, ruling that the nomination process was material 
to the substance of Issue 2 and merited description.335 The court ordered Ohio to 
include a description of the nomination process. The court also ruled that the Ballot 
Board erred in omitting the criteria the commission would follow in drawing 
electoral districts.336  
But the court’s broad stroke on material omissions did not fill every crack and 
crevice. This was perhaps foreseeable, as the court is concerned with “core” function 
over style. In Kilby v. Summit Cty. Bd. of Elections, another ballot language case 
heard in 2012, the Ohio Supreme Court denied a petitioner’s writ of mandamus to 
amend a municipal ballot question when the alleged omissions were deemed 
unrelated to the “critical substance” of the referendum.337 “Additional language may 
have made the summary more complete as to some aspects of the charter 
                                                                                                                                         
 329 Voters First, 978 N.E.2d at 126. 
 330 Id.  
 331 Id.  
 332 Id.  
 333 State ex rel. Kilby v. Summit Cty. Bd. of Elections, 977 N.E.2d 590 (Ohio 2012). 
 334 Id. at 596 (quoting State ex rel. Minus v. Brown, 283 N.E.2d 131 (Ohio 1972)).  
 335 Voters First, 978 N.E.2d at 127 (“It is axiomatic that ‘[w]ho does the appointing is just 
as important as who is appointed.’”) (quoting Laura K. Abel, A Right to Counsel in Civil 
Cases: Lessons from Gideon v. Wainwright, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 527, 545 
(2006)). 
 336 Id. at 129. 
 337 In this case, realigning city council members terms so they are elected on the same year, 
beginning in 2017, altered the term expirations prior to 2017. The Court found the “critical 
substance” of the question a cost-saving measure. Kilby, 977 N.E.2d at 597. 
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amendment, but would also have defeated the purpose of the summary in providing a 
clear, concise description of the amendment to the voters.”338  
In keeping with the law’s focus on substance rather than style, the court refused 
to dip into an evaluation of Ohio’s linguistic choices. Secretary Husted was free to 
keep the state’s preferred term “experts,” rather than “consultants,” to describe the 
commissioners as “appointed officials,” and to describe legislators as “elected 
representatives.”339 Both State ex rel. Voters First and Kilby demonstrate a constant: 
the court is uninterested in the particulars. Rather, the court limits its review to 
correcting omissions or assertions which, by their nature, alter the core construction 
of the question.340 
The Issue 2 decision left both parties in flux. Nominally, it was a win for Voters 
First, and proponents puffed their chests in the public. A spokesperson for Voters 
First told reporters that the court “pointed out exactly what we’ve been saying—that 
Jon Husted and the Ballot Board wrote manipulative language to change the 
outcome of an election.”341 But the court declined to strip away some of the more 
toxic terminology: commissioners were still framed as usurpers of power, 
unaccountable to the public, with the ability to whimsically spend taxpayer money. 
The ball was back in the hands of the conservatives: the writ ordered Secretary 
Husted to reconvene the Ballot Board to revise the ballot language “forthwith.” 
The Ballot Board reconvened on September 13th, 2012.342 Already two days past 
the certification deadline, the board was at a crossroads.343 Should they attempt to re-
draft the referendum language themselves, or pull language directly from the full 
text?344 Some worried that substituting a summary for raw text would cause voter 
confusion, as Issue 2 contained a good deal of legalese.345 Said one board member, 
“what we’re struggling with . . . is we don't want to swap misleading for 
                                                                                                                                         
 338 Id. (quoting Jurcisin v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 519 N.E.2d 347, 352 (Ohio 
1988)). 
 339 The court did find the language describing the funding was misleading. The original 
language proposed by the Ballot Board read that Issue 2 would “[m]andate the General 
Assembly to appropriate all funds as determined by the Commission.” This contradicted the 
text, which only called for funds “necessary to adequately fund the activities [of the 
commission].” The court noted that if this was the only discrepancy, it might have let the 
language stand. The cumulative omissions were cause for invalidity. Voters First, 978 N.E.2d 
at 130. 
 340 “We reject relators’ remaining claims of material omissions concerning the 
commission’s name and the provisions for an open redistricting process because we are not 
persuaded that the omission of these items prevents voters from knowing the substance of the 
proposal being voted upon or misleads, deceives, or defrauds voters.” Id. at 129. 
 341 Jim Siegel, High Court Tells Ballot Board to Rewrite Issue 2, COLUMBUS DISPATCH 
(Sept. 13, 2012), http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2012/09/13/high-court-tells-
ballot-board-to-rewrite-issue-2.html. 
 342 Meeting of the Ohio Ballot Board Pursuant to R.C. 3505.062(A) (Sept. 13, 2012), 
http://www.sos.state.oh.us/sos/upload/ballotboard/2012/2012-09-13-transcript.pdf. 
 343 Id. at 4. 
 344 Id. at 5-8 
 345 Id. at 15. 
44https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol63/iss4/10
2015] REDISTRICTING REFORM THROUGH REFERENDUM 945 
 
confusing.”346 Citing the risk of improperly summarizing the commission selection 
process, the board voted to adopt large portions of the exact language of Issue 2 for 
the finalized ballot language. 
The final product was monstrous. Voters First, the prevailing party only days 
beforehand, saw its referendum effectively ruined. The final text might have been 
the worst of all solutions: the nomination process was now seven hundred words 
long, largely pejorative, and complex.347 But it was legally sufficient. By 
comparison, the Ballot Board’s quashed description of the nomination process was 
surprisingly efficient: despite the incendiary terms, it described the bipartisan 
composition of the commission in 54 words.348 Even this draft—written by the 
Republican opposition—might have fared better, or at least proven less confusing, 
than the final text.  
3. Lessons Learned: Keep it Simple 
One lesson learned from State ex rel. Voters First is an odd one, perhaps best 
chalked up to “be careful what you wish for.” Voters First sensibly petitioned the 
supreme court to correct a biased referendum summary. Voters First hoped the court 
would order certain depreciatory terms erased. Instead, the court ordered the Ballot 
Board to make the language more inclusive. It didn’t matter if the Ballot Board 
attempted to “better” summarize the process or just added more words. The 
conservative majority on the Ballot Board assumed the language left unturned by the 
court was valid. In short, it could only get worse, not better, for Voters First.  
This should not suggest bias from the court.349 In fact, in a concurring opinion, 
Justice Pfeifer, a Republican, offered his own draft of Issue 2.350 Omitting the nuts 
and bolts of the nomination process, and rounding over some of the rougher corners 
hewed by the Ballot Board, Justice Pfeifer’s language was, perhaps, the ideal 
compromise between the competing factions. At 446 words, it was consumable for 
voters.351 Responding to the final, bloated text, Voters First representative Ann 
Henkener invoked Justice Pfeifer’s summary, saying “it was very easy for the court 
to do that. It seemed to be very confusing for the Ballot Board to be able to do that. 
It would have been very easy to adopt the court’s language, it was very clear.” 
Partisanship aside, the Ballot Board had pragmatic reasons to avoid a second 
round of issue drafting. To start, Justice Pfeifer’s draft was a single concurring 
opinion. Besides, the Pfeifer summary did not attempt to describe the nomination 
                                                                                                                                         
 346 Id. 
 347 ISSUE 2 FULL TEXT, supra note 62. 
 348 “Create a state funded commission of appointed officials from a limited pool of 
applicants to replace the aforementioned. The Commission will consist of 12 members as 
follows: four affiliated with the largest political party, four affiliated with the second largest 
political party and four not affiliated with either of the two largest political parties.” State ex 
rel. Voters First v. Ohio Ballot Bd., 978 N.E.2d 119, 123 (Ohio 2012). 
 349 Interestingly, and perhaps because Voters First was the nominal winner, there were no 
public charges of partisanship in the court’s decision, even though six of the seven sitting 
justices were affiliated with the Republican Party. Ohio Supreme Court Justices, OHIO 
BUSINESS VOTES, http://ohiobusinessvotes.org/government/ohio-supreme-court-justices.  
 350 Id.; Voters First, 978 N.E.2d at 133-34. 
 351 Voters First, 978 N.E.2d at 133-34. 
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process, a clear mandate from the majority. Already past certification deadline, 
board members objected to summarizing Issue 2 in their own words—an effort that 
got them into court in the first place. If the conservative goal was to sully the ballot 
while avoiding a second round of litigation, then Issue 2’s thicket of legalese 
provided the ideal means to accomplish just that. 
The takeaway for the purposes of this study is simple. To present a simple 
question to voters, give the Ballot Board a simple referendum. Ideally, a question 
should be drafted so that the raw text can appear on the ballot and still be 
understandable to the average voter. Issue 2 described a very complicated 
nomination process—similar to what passed in California. But that process 
translated poorly on a ballot. It would be an oversimplification to say that, in order to 
win, drafters should accept a flawed policy. Rather the process is about compromise. 
Arizona’s selection process is relatively straightforward when compared to 
California’s. This does not suggest California’s is somehow better than Arizona’s. Is 
a lottery managed by the legislature fundamentally flawed when compared to a 
judicially managed lottery? I would argue no. Is it critical for nine commissioners to 
then select another three, instead of selecting all nine by lottery? On balance, a 
simple nomination process, that still protects the independence of the commission 
through adequate safeguards, is preferable.  
B. If It Looks Like a Tax, It is a Tax 
Issue 2 left little to chance. Not only did the drafters insulate the citizens 
commission from political tampering through an extensive nomination process, but it 
included other protections to isolate the commission from political influence.352 One 
such protection was money. Issue 2 required that the commission receive “any 
necessary” and “adequate” funds, ensuring, one might assume, that the legislature 
could not starve the commission from necessary resources.353 But by leaving the 
amount uncapped, Voters First opened Issue 2 up for attack. 
The Ohio Office of Management and Budget estimated that Issue 2 would cost 
taxpayers between $10,975,000 and $15,225,000 in the first eight years.354 Fiscal 
                                                                                                                                         
 352 Among others, Issue 2 had restrictions of previous contact with elected officials (to 
include employment and lobbying), restricted removal (discussed below), ensured the 
commission held open meetings and hearings, and made all commissioner correspondence 
public record. ISSUE 2 FULL TEXT, supra note 62. 
 353 Id. This is hardly unusual—many establishing statutes provide specific salaries for 
commission members, and some allow commissions to hire staff. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 4709.04 (West 1992) (salaries and costs for barbers commission); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 4301.07 (West 2015) (liquor control commission salaries); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
3517.152 (West 2015) (establishes elections commission salaries and right to hire technical, 
professional, and clerical employees). Other redistricting commissions have done the same. 
Colorado uses nearly an identical provision in its constitution, requiring the legislature 
“appropriate sufficient funds for the compensation and payment of the expenses of the 
commission members and any staff employed by it.” COLO. CONST. art. V, § 48(f). 
 354 Issue 2 Expenditure Analysis, OHIO OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET (Oct. 3, 2012), available 
at http://www.sos.state.oh.us/sos/upload/ballotboard/2012/2-fiscalanalysis.pdf. Some liberals 
questioned the accuracy of the OMB analysis. “It’s just a hollow shell of numbers offered by a 
political flack whose job depends on John Kasich remaining in office,” said Democratic Party 
Chairman Chris Redfern. Joe Guillen, Redistricting Reform Proposal Would Cost Taxpayers 
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conservatives cringed—the funding provision looked like a new tax. Worse, 
opponents pointed out that the funding provisions were automatic—mandatory, in 
fact—without ceiling or stopgap. At one point, the conservative ballot language 
described the commissioners as “setting their own salaries.”355 
California and Arizona’s redistricting referendums both included funding 
provisions. Arizona Proposition 106 granted a block of six million dollars for the 
commission in the first year, with authorization for the commission to spend the 
funds.356 California set limits on commissioner compensation as well as a ceiling on 
the total funds to be allotted to the commission.357  
Issue 2 wisely appropriated “any necessary” and “adequate” money, as 
redistricting is a complicated process requiring access to computer models, extensive 
community data, and expert consultants. Denying the board an array of technical and 
analytical resources would lead to asymmetric information and a dependency on 
outside assistance. To mitigate, I propose both a floor and a cap on funds. To avoid 
any charge of reckless spending, that cap should be based on historical costs, 
adjusted for inflation. California provides its commission an “amount expended . . . 
in the immediately preceding redistricting process” adjusted against the Consumer 
Price Index.358 
Using the California model, a future referendum should set a baseline for the 
commission’s funding, and make it adjustable for inflation. This number should be 
stated in terms of the money spent by the legislature during the previous round of 
redistricting (in Ohio, this is as recent as 2011).359 
C. Avoid Appearances of Unaccountability 
For all of Issue 2’s thoughtful construction, one provision was notably absent. 
Issue 2 did not provide a mechanism for commissioner removal. In fact, Issue 2 went 
further, mandating that “[n]o member of the Commission shall be subject to removal 
by the general assembly or any member of the executive branch.”360 This was a 
                                                                                                                                         
Millions, According to State Budget Office, PLAIN DEALER (Oct. 3, 2012), 
http://www.cleveland.com/open/index.ssf/2012/10/redistricting_reform_proposal_1.html. 
 355 The salary provision was thrown out by the Ohio Supreme Court, though the majority 
found that, standing alone, this claim was not fatal to the ballot language. Voters First, 978 
N.E.2d at 130. 
 356 Full Text of Arizona Proposition 106, ARIZ. REDISTRICTING COMM’N, available at 
http://azredistricting.org/2001/Prop-106.asp. 
 357 Prop 11 called for a daily compensation rate of three hundred dollars, plus certain 
expenses. CALIFORNIA PROPOSITION 11, § 8253.5, CAL. VOTER FOUND., available at 
http://www.calvoter.org/issues/votereng/redistricting/prop11text.html. 
 358 Id. at § 8253.6. 
 359 The “floor” amounts granted by Arizona and California were six million and three 
million, respectively. ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1; CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8253.6 (West 
2013). Certainly a future referendum should consider, in some detail, real financial 
requirements, to include actual redistricting expenditures in Ohio and like states. Of course, 
not setting an actual dollar amount is itself risky—the calculations of what the last round of 
redistricting “cost” is subject to litigation. 
 360 ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1; CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8253.6 (West 2013). 
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drastic point of departure from the California model, which allows the governor and 
two-thirds of the legislature to remove commission members for cause.361  
Commissioners must be removable by the legislature. No matter how well 
designed, any nomination system is moot if a bad seed is allowed to poison the 
commission. The caveat is that removal must be limited to cause, and subject to a 
two-thirds vote by the legislature.  
V. CONCLUSION: A MODEL REFERENDUM 
“Therefore the clever combatant imposes his will on the enemy, but does 
not allow the enemy's will to be imposed on him.”  
   -Sun Tzu362 
 
The natural starting point for a model referendum is the full text of Issue 2. Issue 
2 was a combined effort, largely drafted by the election law experts at Moritz Center 
for Election Law at Ohio State University, along with the League of Women Voters. 
Although this Note sometimes takes a critical tact—based only on the benefits of 
hindsight—the substance of Issue 2 included the very best ideas and architecture 
from around the nation. 
I propose changes that simplify the process while maintaining accountability to 
the public. My proposal replaces Issue 2’s extensive nomination process with the 
simple lottery described in Part III, above. It also mandates automatic judicial review 
of every map certified by the commission, caps expenditures, and adds a provision 
for commission removal for cause.  
But the core of Issue 2 remains untouched. I do not alter the guiding criteria 
commissioners are to follow in drafting boundaries. On this I defer to the experts.363 I 
keep various provisions for public comment and open meetings. I maintain the 
timelines and basic structure of the commissioners. Indeed, the thrust of this 
referendum belongs to Voters First. However, much of the text is radically 
simplified to provide guidelines instead of strict goalposts. Will this inevitably lead 
to litigation? Probably. Perhaps it will also lead to legislative action, new judicial 
standards of review, public discourse, academic debate, and willingness to entertain 
future amendments to the constitution, more in line to the Issue 2 full text. This 
proposal is a beginning, not an end. 
The referendum below includes certain articles of the Ohio Constitution along 
with proposed additions and deletions. The current and unaltered constitutional text 
is not formatted. My proposed amendments are in bold.  
If Ohio citizens disagree with the current redistricting system, change by 
referendum is the quickest method of reform. As a constitutional change, it is 
durable, and may ensure open doors and accountability. Certainly there are many 
valid arguments for and against any method of distributing single- member districts. 
But as long as the single-member district remains the standard unit of 
                                                                                                                                         
 361 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8252.5 (West 2013). California also requires its citizens 
commission to adopt a conflict-of-interest policy and ethics rules. Id.  
 362 SUN TZU, THE ART OF WAR VI § 2 (Lionel Giles trans.), available at 
http://classics.mit.edu//Tzu/artwar.html. 
 363 Indeed, an entire field of election reform is predicated on the best criteria to draw 
districts.  
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representational democracy, these debates will continue. I hope this proposed 
constitutional change allows for bipartisan, informed, and open map drawing, while 
providing the public accountability and oversight.  
VI. OHIO ISSUE 2.1 
Be it Resolved by the People of the State of Ohio that Article XI, Sections 1, 6, 
and 7 of the Ohio Constitution be amended, Article XI, Sections 8364, 10,365 and 14366 
                                                                                                                                         
 364 The original text reads as follows:  
A county having at least one house of representatives ratio of representation shall have 
as many house of representatives districts wholly within the boundaries of the county 
as it has whole ratios of representation. Any fraction of the population in excess of a 
whole ratio shall be a part of only one adjoining house of representatives district. The 
number of whole ratios of representation for a county shall be determined by dividing 
the population of the county by the ratio of representation for the house of 
representatives determined under section 2 of this Article. 
OHIO CONST. art. XI, § 8. 
 365 Section 10 controlled the dividing and subdividing of counties into congressional 
representative districts. I have chosen to eliminate this section. Respecting county lines is 
certainly a common sense practice. But, this consideration is included in the six factors 
enumerated in Section 7, below. If a single county happened to closely match the population 
requirement of either a state or congressional set, it is likely that the commission might 
consider this simple solution, anyway. I see no reason to require certain counties as a district, 
especially if in so doing neighboring districts become less compact. A further problem 
develops in that paragraph (B)—allowing a single member district with as low as 90 percent 
the required population—is probably illegal under Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983). 
The original text reads as follows:  
(A) Each county containing population substantially equal to one ratio of 
representation in the House of Representatives, as provided in section 2 of this Article, 
but in no event less than ninety-five per cent of the ratio nor more than one hundred 
five per cent of the ratio shall be designated a representative district. 
 
(B) Each county containing population between ninety and ninety-five percent of the 
ratio or between one hundred five and one hundred ten per cent of the ratio may be 
designated a representative district. 
 
(C) Proceeding in succession from the largest to the smallest, each remaining county 
containing more than one whole ratio of representation shall be divided into House of 
Representatives districts. Any remaining territory within such county containing a 
fraction of one whole ratio of representation shall be included in one representative 
district by combining it with adjoining territory outside the county. 
 
(D) The remaining territory of the state shall be combined into representative districts. 
(C) Proceeding in succession from the largest to the smallest, each remaining county 
containing more than one whole ratio of representation shall be divided into house of 
representatives districts. Any remaining territory within such county containing a 
fraction of one whole ratio of representation shall be included in one representative 
district by combining it with adjoining territory outside the county. 
OHIO CONST. art. XI, § 10. 
 366 The original text reads as follows:  
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of the Ohio Constitution367 be repealed as follows: 
Article XI, Section 1.368 Ohio Citizens Independent Redistricting 
Commission 
                                                                                                                                         
The boundaries of house of representatives districts and senate districts from which 
representatives and senators were elected to the 107th general assembly shall be the 
boundaries of house of representatives and senate districts until January 1, 1973, and 
representatives and senators elected in the general election in 1966 shall hold office 
for the terms to which they were elected. In the event all or any part of this 
apportionment plan is held invalid prior to the general election in the year 1970, the 
persons responsible for apportionment by a majority of their number shall ascertain 
and determine a plan of apportionment to be effective until January 1, 1973, in 
accordance with section 13 of this Article. 
OHIO CONST. art. XI, § 14. 
 367 Notably, I did not amend Section 13. Section 13 grants the Supreme Court of Ohio 
original jurisdiction on redistricting matters. This section also spells out the process followed 
in case a map is found unconstitutional. Therein, it describes the redistricting body as “persons 
responsible for apportionment.” This would now refer, quite explicitly, to the citizens 
commission. Of note, Section 13 allows the Governor to call the commission into session on 
two-weeks notice, presumably to re-draft a rejected (unconstitutional) map. It is difficult to 
predict if the assembly-on-notice could be used anytime other than to schedule the decennial 
drafting or subsequent court-ordered redrafts. The original text reads as follows:  
The supreme court of Ohio shall have exclusive, original jurisdiction in all cases 
arising under this Article. In the event that any section of this Constitution relating to 
apportionment or any plan of apportionment made by the persons responsible for 
apportionment, by a majority of their number, is determined to be invalid by either the 
supreme court of Ohio, or the supreme court of the United States, then 
notwithstanding any other provisions of this Constitution, the persons responsible for 
apportionment by a majority of their number shall ascertain and determine a plan of 
apportionment in conformity with such provisions of this Constitution as are then 
valid, including establishing terms of office and election of members of the general 
assembly from districts designated in the plan, to be used until the next regular 
apportionment in conformity with such provisions of this Constitution as are then 
valid. Notwithstanding any provision of this Constitution or any law regarding the 
residence of senators and representatives, a plan of apportionment made pursuant to 
this section shall allow thirty days for persons to change residence in order to be 
eligible for election. The governor shall give the persons responsible for 
apportionment two weeks advance written notice of the date, time, and place of any 
meeting held pursuant to this section.  
OHIO CONST. art. XI, § 13. 
 368 “The governor, auditor of state, secretary of state, one person chosen by the speaker of 
the house of representatives and the leader in the senate of the political party of which the 
speaker is a member, and one person chosen by the legislative leaders in the two houses of the 
major political party of which the speaker is not a member shall be the persons responsible for 
the apportionment of this state for members of the general assembly. Such persons, or a 
majority of their number, shall meet and establish in the manner prescribed in this Article the 
boundaries for each of ninety-nine house of representatives districts and thirty-three senate 
districts. Such meeting shall convene on a date designated by the governor between August 1 
and October 1 in the year one thousand nine hundred seventy-one and every tenth year 
thereafter. The governor shall give such persons two weeks advance notice of the date, time, 
and place of such meeting. The governor shall cause the apportionment to be published no 
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(A) There is hereby created the Ohio Citizens Independent 
Redistricting Commission, which shall meet and establish, in the 
manner prescribed in this Article, the boundaries for each of Ohio’s 
state legislative and congressional districts. 
 
(B) The Commission shall be established upon the approval of this 
amendment to the Ohio Constitution by the voters of Ohio and again 
following each federal decennial census. 
 
(C) The Commission shall consist of twelve members, chosen by 
lottery, which shall include a total of four members affiliated with the 
largest political party, four members affiliated with the second largest 
political party, and four members not affiliated with either of these 
parties. The General Assembly will publish eligibility criteria, collect 
applications, and determine a place, time, and manner for choosing 
members by lottery. Only citizens who are not serving, or who have 
not served in the preceding five years, in any municipal, state, or 
federal elected office may apply for membership. Members of the 
Commission may be removed for just cause with the concurrence of 
two-thirds of the Senate. 
 
(D) The Commission is authorized to hire necessary staff, experts, 
legal counsel and use the services of existing state employees in order 
to fulfill the Commission’s responsibilities. The appropriation made 
shall not exceed the amount expended in the immediately preceding 
redistricting process, adjusted for inflation according to the 
Consumer Price Index, except where the General Assembly 
appropriates a greater amount. Unused monies shall be returned to 
the general fund. Members of the Commission shall be reasonably 
compensated at the rate designated by the General Assembly. 
 
(E) All meetings of the Commission shall be open to the public, and 
all records, communications, and draft plans of the Commission, its 
individual members, or staff related to the Commission’s duties are 
public records. 
 
(F) All proposed redistricting plans and maps shall be made available 
to the public for at least 30 days with opportunity for public 
comment, before being approved by the Commission. 
 
(G) The affirmative vote of at least seven members of the Commission 
shall be required to adopt any plan. 
 
(H) The Commission shall establish and publish the new district 
boundaries no later than October 1 of the year prior to the year 
                                                                                                                                         
later than October 5 of the year in which it is made, in such manner as provided by law.” OHIO 
CONST. art. XI, § 1. 
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elections shall be held in the new districts. On establishing new 
district boundaries, the Commission shall submit the boundaries to 
the Ohio Supreme Court for review with requirements herein. 
 
Article XI, Section 6.369 
(2) Except, upon the approval of this amendment to the Ohio 
Constitution, new district boundaries shall be established for Ohio’s 
state legislative and congressional districts. The new district 
boundaries shall be used in the next regularly scheduled federal and 
state elections that are held more than one year after the adoption of 
this amendment.  
 
Article XI, Section 7.370 
                                                                                                                                         
 369 This is an added paragraph, which allows immediate redistricting. This falls below, and 
as an exception to, the limit on decennial redistricting, following the census. The top of 
Section 6 reads:  
District boundaries established pursuant to this Article shall not be changed until the 
ensuing federal decennial census and the ensuing apportionment or as provided in 
section 13 of this Article, notwithstanding the fact that boundaries of political 
subdivisions or city wards within the district may be changed during that time. District 
boundaries shall be created by using the boundaries of political subdivisions and city 
wards as they exist at the time of the federal decennial census on which the 
apportionment is based, or such other basis as the general assembly has directed.  
OHIO CONST. art. XI, § 6. 
 370 Section 7 describes the requirements and considerations in how to draw the boundaries. 
The constitution requires compactness and contiguity. Here, the five factors (“continuity, 
community preservation, competitiveness, representational fairness, and compactness”) are 
inserted. The original text reads as follows:  
(A) Every house of representatives district shall be compact and composed of 
contiguous territory, and the boundary of each district shall be a single nonintersecting 
continuous line. To the extent consistent with the requirements of section 3 of this 
Article, the boundary lines of districts shall be so drawn as to delineate an area 
containing one or more whole counties. 
 
(B) Where the requirements of section 3 of this Article cannot feasibly be attained by 
forming a district from a whole county or counties, such district shall be formed by 
combining the areas of governmental units giving preference in the order named to 
counties, townships, municipalities, and city wards.  
 
(C) Where the requirements of section 3 of this Article cannot feasibly be attained by 
combining the areas of governmental units as prescribed in division (B) of this 
section, only one such unit may be divided between two districts, giving preference in 
the selection of a unit for division to a township, a city ward, a city, and a village in 
the order named. 
 
(D) In making a new apportionment, district boundaries established by the preceding 
apportionment shall be adopted to the extent reasonably consistent with the 
requirements of section 3 of this Article.  
OHIO CONST. art. XI, § 7.  
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(C) The Commission shall adopt a redistricting plan that, in its 
judgment, most closely meets the following factors: continuity, 
compactness, community preservation, competitiveness, 
representational fairness, and compactness. 
 
(D) The Commission shall make publicly available with each 
proposed redistricting plan a report that identifies the following 
information for each district: boundaries, population, racial and 
ethnic composition, compactness measure, governmental units that 
are divided, and political party indexes.  
 
(E) No plan shall be drawn or adopted with intent to favor or disfavor 
a political party, incumbent, or potential candidate. 
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